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This study examines the effects of the announcement of the general election result on 
stock returns of 42 companies with government institutional holdings in Malaysia 
during 2008, 2013 and 2018 general elections. The study employs an event study 
methodology using the Market model (MM)  and Market adjusted return (MAR). The 
findings indicate that there is a positive relationship between cumulative abnormal 
return and companies with government institutional holdings during event windows 
from the fifth day after the announcement of election result to 60 days after the event. 
This result implies that the market in Malaysia is semi-efficient, where investors react 
on the publicly available information particularly during the 13th general election. 
Nonetheless, the result shows that the impact is indifferent no matter which party won 
the election. The cumulative abnormal return shows  significant positive for all three 
election result announcements even though in 2018, the opposition party, Parti 
Harapan won for the first time after 60 years Parti Barisan Nasional has ruled 
Malaysia. Besides, there is also evidence that institutional investors in Malaysia act as 
passive investors  whom  trade like retail trader to gain profit instead of monitoring  
the company to improve their performance. 
 
Keywords : general election result, institutional investors, event study methodology, 














Kajian ini mengkaji kesan keputusan pilihanraya umum terhadap pulangan saham 
pada 42 syarikat awam dengan pegangan pelabur intitusi kerajaan di Malaysia semasa 
pilihanraya umum pada tahun 2008, 2013 dan 2018. Kajian ini menguji hipotesis yang 
dikaji dengan menggunakan metodologi kajian peristiwa dengan kaedah Market 
Model (MM) dan Market Adjusted Return (MAR). Hasil kajian mendapati bahawa 
terdapat hubungan positif pulangan abnormal kumulatif oleh syarikat dengan 
pegangan peabur intitusi kerajaan dalam tempoh tingkap acara bermula seawal hari ke 
lima selepas pengumuman keputusan pilihanraya umum hingaa hari ke 60 selepas 
peristiwa. Ini menunjukkan bahawa Malaysia mempunyai pasaran separuh cekap di 
mana pelabur bertindak terhadap maklumat awam yang diperolehi terutamaya ketika 
pilihanraya umum ke 13. Walaubagaimanapun, keputusan pilihanraya dilihat memberi 
kesan sama tanpa mengira parti yang menang ketika pilihanraya. Pulangan abnormal 
kumulatif menunjukkan kesan positif selapas pengumuman keputusan ketiga tiga 
pilihanraya walaupun semasa 2018 pilihanraya umum di Malaysia dimenangi Parti 
Harapan Rakyat selepas 60 tahun di pegang oleh Parti Barisan Nasional. Selain itu, 
didapati bahawa pelabur intitusi di Malaysia bertindak sebagai pelabur pasif di mana 
mereka hanya melabur untuk memperoleh keuntungan, bukan nya sebagai pemerhati 
untuk menambah baik prestasi syarikat dilabur. 
 
 
Kata Kunci: keputusan pilihanraya umum, pelabur institusi, metodologi kajian 
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Stock prices are the result of inhuman volatility expectations. The nature of human 
behavior is the main direction of changes in supply and demand in the market. This 
situation causes oscillation in prices. Fluctuation in prices is the natural process of the 
changes in expectation which look like a cycle in the market. Many kinds of sequence 
and variable could drive the changes. Political cycle is one of the cycles in the market. 
Political cycle include election, changes in ruler or authority and war. Investors in 
modern financial markets have a significant amount of diverse information such as 
corporate earnings report, macroeconomic indicator, political statement and news 
which include election outcome.  
The risk-as-feeling model by Lowesntein, Hsee, Weber, and Welch (2001) 
revealed that the person's feeling is affected by the cognitive evaluation that can lead 
to the behavioral response. This model explained why the emotions of the voters are 
crucial in determining the winning party during the election. The emotional factor 
possibly influences the voter’s decision-making during the election. The incumbent 
political parties usually will make a decision that biased against voter's need to gain 
support.  
Fama (1965) in his statistical regression has confirmed that the stock prices are 
correlated with future economic activity. During the general election, the confidence 
on the party that is elected will reflect in underlying financial condition, which is vital 
in determining stock prices. Whenever there is an optimistic feeling by investors on 
future economic, they will decide to invest in the stock market. In contrast, whenever 
the investors feel insecure about the economy future, they will choose to exit from the 
market. The event of the general election remarked as a unique and historical event in 
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all countries. During the pre-election period, the campaign promises made by the 
candidates can affect the emotional and behavior of the public and investors. This 
cause dramatic changes in the stock market. However, the post-election effect might 
be caused by several factors such as the change in political orientation, the narrow 
margin of victory or the losses of favorite by public unexpectedly.  
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) introduced by Fama (1965) assume that 
financial market incorporated all public information which then, affect the share price 
to reflect all relevant information. Correct information is essential to form a better 
expectation by investors. The more efficient the market, the more random sequence of 
price changes generated by the market which lead to the completely random and 
unpredictable price change in the stock market.  
The role of institutional investors can be described in the scenarios introduced by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) which is active monitoring and passive monitoring. The 
active monitoring by institutional investors will be likely to result in improved firm 
performance because institutional investors are considered as large and sophisticated 
investors that can give incentive and expertise to monitor the management. The 
passive monitoring, on the other hand, is based on the argument that institutional 
investors might be the short term investors who are acting like common traders ( 
holding or selling stocks according to their portfolio) instead of monitoring the 
management and improving the corporate governance in the firm  
Election and stock market is closely related considering the risk and investor's 
behavior. The uncertainty of the winning party after the election may result in the 
disposal of shares by investors and neglecting the real value of the stocks. Many 
studies have been done to see the impact of the election on the stock market. The result 
varies depending on people's choices. In the US, every election has come with the poll 
before the election. A study by Levil and Yagil (2015) shows that if the people's 
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favourite led the ballot, it would have a positive cumulative abnormal return in the 
market until the announcement of the election result. 
 
1.1 Background of Study 
1.1.1 General Election in Malaysia 
The election in Malaysia exists at two level, federal and state. The most significant 
and most important election is at the national level where voters will select the 222 
members of Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives). Any party that won the 
majority seats in the House of Representative will form the federal government. This 
general election must be held at least once every five years. The campaign period in 
Malaysia runs from the nomination day until polling day. However, since 1999, the 
public radio station, Radio Television Malaysia (RTM) was controlled entirely by the 
government where the manifestos broadcasted is only coming from government 
(Barisan Nasional during that time). The policy has restricted the proclamations by 
opposition being transmitted anywhere in public station in Malaysia (Ingram, 1999). 
Evidence from the previous studies shows that there was significant election 
effect in stock performance for the last general election held in Malaysia (Jiun, 2018; 
Liew & Rowland, 2016; Yusoff, Salleh, Ahmad & Idris, 2015). Malaysia has 
undergone 14 series of the general election for the past 60 years. 12th and 13th Malaysia 
general election has shown a significant impact on stock market volatility compared 
to the previous series of election (Jiun, 2018). This situation caused by the close fight 
between two major parties. Prior to 2008, the general election result in Malaysia have 
never been unexpected as the incumbent coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN) won in the 
substantial two-third majority in all general elections. However, the 12th general 
election in 2008 was the first time BN lost the two-thirds majority in Parliament. The 
tense continues in 2013 during 13th general election where BN still won but with a 
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lower number of seats compared to 2008. The 14th Malaysia general election on 9th 
May 2018 has been marked as history when the first time since independence, the 
opposition (Pakatan Harapan) defeat the incumbent coalition (BN). Table 1 below 
shows the election date and percentage seats of 12th, 13th, and 14th Malaysia general 
election. 
 
Table 1.1  




Barisan Nasional Opposition 
12th general election 8 March 2008                               
( Saturday) 
63.06 36.94 
13th general election 5 May 2013                            
(Sunday) 
59.91 40.09 
14th general election 9 May 2018                           
(Wednesday) 
43.69 *56.31 
Source: own compilation based on information from Election Commission of Malaysia 
* In 2018, the opposition (Parti Harapan) has won the majority seats and form the federal 
government which makes them the government party. 
 
 
Table 1.1 above clearly show the reducing of interest by voters on previously 
incumbent Barisan Nasional since the 12th general election in 2008. The interest in 
government during that time continue to decrease until 2018 when finally, the 
opposition (Parti Harapan) defeated Barisan Nasional and form a new federal 
government when they won majority seats of two-thirds.  
Previously, during the competitive fight between incumbent and opposition in 
12th and 13th Malaysia general election, there was a significant reaction in FTSE Bursa 
Malaysia KLCI (Jiun, 2018). Figure 1.1 below shows the FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI 





From Figure 1.1 above, there was a fall of -0.74 percent in KLCI index two days 
before the general election which is 9th May 2018. However, the stock market 
increases back by 1percent the day before the event. The trend shows a slight increase 
when the market opens again on 14th May. The sudden drop happened around a 
fortnight after the event where there is a drop by -3.8percent. After that, the Malaysia 
stock market shows a fluctuating trend in these past seven months after the new 
government elected. However, the index shows a downward trend almost all the time 
with the lowest value in 18th December 2018 when the index falls to 1,635.31. in terms 
of volume, the highest buy happened after the general election where the recorded 
transaction is 402.49M shares compare to 179.71M shares unit before the election day. 
The highest selling volume can be seen on 5th November 2018 with 516.42M shares 





FTSE KLCI Index from February 2018 until January 2019 




1.2 Problem Statement 
The view on past works of literature has seen a vast amount of studies that are 
focusing on the impact of political risk and market performance. For the past decades, 
most studies have agreed that political risk include the event of general election (Belo, 
Gala and Li, 2013;  Chuang & Wang, 2010; Durnev & McGill,2010; Kim,Pantzalis 
&Park, 2012; Lehkonen & Heimonen, 2015; Li, Li & Xu, 2017;  Liu, Shu & Wei, 
2017; Jens, 2017; Menge, 2013; Shen, Bui & Lin, 2017; Winiewski, 2016;  Yusoff, 
Salleh, Ahmad and Idris, 2015). Major democratic countries1 have always been 
subject of interest by researcher because of their high competitiveness and significant 
impact on the market for each cycle of the ruling (Chuang & Wang, 2010; Wang, Lee, 
& Lin, 2015). For major democratic countries, there were polls available before 
polling day to predict the real election outcome which is beneficial to investors during 
the election period. This poll creates a cushioned impact or less shock upon the 
announcement of the winning party. 
Furthermore, it is common for most countries to witness the changes in the 
incumbent in every or some cycle of the ruling. Some literature on political differences 
has agreed that there is a significant impact on market performance depending on the 
winning party. In contrast, Malaysia has never been ruled by the different government 
for the past 60 years. In 2018, the incumbent (Barisan Nasional) lost for the first time 
in history. This makes the opposition (now government), Parti Harapan to form the 
new federal government. Since the formation of a new government involved a new 
front of peoples to govern the country, the question arises whether this new 
government can make Malaysia better than the so long-ruling party, Barisan Nasional. 
This sentiment is important because it can affect the investor’s decision on investing 
                                                 
1 Major democratic countries are large country that have presidential election after each ruling cycle. 
In literature used for this study, major democratic countries are United State, Japan, the United 
Kingdom and France 
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in Malaysia market. Since past literature has shown evidenced that 12th general 
election and the 13th general election has demonstrated a significant impact on 
Malaysia market performance because of the close fight between incumbent and 
opposition, it is vital to further the study on the effects when the opposition won the 
fight during the general election. Besides, there is also numerous numbers of literature 
that discover the significant impact of institutional holding on firm performance. 
Government holding was known as one of the largest institutional investors in 
Malaysia company. Government holding in a company is found to reduce the effects 
of political uncertainty (Zhou, 2017) and likeliness to default (Zeitun, 2009) but have 
mixed result on the firm's performance. The investors' confidence in the federal 
government, can also give an impact on the performance of the company with 
government holdings. In researcher knowledge, the only study looking at government 
holding and firm's performance in this past decade only involved China. Hence, this 
study attempts to fill the research gap by analyzing the impact of the general election 
on companies with government institutional holding in Malaysia. Besides, there is a 
gap in the literatures where most of the studies that looking at institutional ownership 
only focuses on the impact ownership concentration and ownership stability on firm 
performance. Very few studies examine the impact of institutional ownership type on 
firm performance.  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
The research questions for this study were: 
1. Does 12th,13th and 14th Malaysia general election gives an impact on the stock 
price of company with institutional holding? 
2. How does announcement of the general election outcome impact the stock 
return of company with institutional holding? 
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3. What factors explained the returns of company with institutional holdings 
during general election? 
 
1.4 Research Objective 
The research objectives of this study were: 
1. To evaluate the impact of Malaysia general election on the stock price of 
company with institutional holding.  
2. To determine whether the general election create value to the company with 
institutional holding. 
3. To explore factors that affect firm stock performance following the general 
election result. 
 
1.5 Significance of Research 
Investors generally regard political risk as a significant influential factor in their 
portfolio management. The inefficiency of speculating the outcome of stock 
performance might result in the loss in capital invested. This is why the government 
and policy maker should dedicate more efforts towards improving the efficient stock 
market to avoid any catastrophic fall in the market. 
This study will reveal the insight of the Malaysia stock market for investors not 
only local but also foreign investors. Investors usually rational and risk-averse which 
need more in-depth and reliable information to make deliberate and informed 
decisions to secure their capital when investing in a relatively risky stock market. The 
empirical work from this research will provide better insight into how political event 
affects Malaysia stock market. Investors can make a better decision in allocating assets 
portfolio during the event of the general election. The same as fund manager, if there 
is evidence that general election affects stock returns of certain companies, fund 
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manager should consider adding or disposing their fund allocation in certain 
companies whenever general election is going to happen. Investors can also use the 
information to invest or dispose their share during the event of general election. Stock 
analyst, on the other hand, can use the available information in forecasting data on 
their side and adjust the data accordingly whenever there is a general election coming.  
 
1.6 Scope of Research 
This study will cover the individual country of Malaysia during 12th, 13th and 14th 
general election. The proxy of company stock performance is the abnormal daily stock 
return during the election period. The election window period considered is 20 days 
before the announcement of election result until 60 days after the election result. The 
event day selected in this study only focus on the last three general elections namely 
12th, 13th, and the 14th general election is 10 March 2008, 6 May 2013 and 14 May 
2018 correspondingly. These event days selected is the first trading day when the 
market open after the announcement of election result. The sample use for this study 
is public listed companies with government ownership. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
Briefly, chapter one elaborates the background, problem statement and objectives 
of this study. The vital theory as center of this research is the classical theory of 
Efficient Market Hypothesis that is going to be tested during 12th, 13th and 14th general 
election in Malaysia.  
The organization of remaining chapter is divided into four sections: Chapter two 
describes the past literature review that related to political events and institutional 
ownership. Chapter three describes the data and methodology uses in this study 
besides hypotheses development. The next chapter, chapter four shows the results 
 
 10 
from analysis done to test the hypothesis deducted in chapter three. Last chapter, 
chapter five conclude the findings in summary, conclusion and limitation of study, and 













2.0  Introduction 
  This chapter begins with a review of the theories related to market reaction and 
institutional investors. Since the research focus on the relationship between political 
event and stock market reaction, it is necessary to review the existing studies that 
related to market performance and political risk in every aspect. 
 Section 2.2 reviews the impact of institutional investors ownership on firm 
performance with the segregated discussion on different institutional ownership 
concentration, ownership stability and institutional investors' type.   
  The following section reviews the political risk impact on market performance. 
The most used methodology in measuring the effects of the political event on market 
performance is the event study. Political risks mostly have been identified as the 
occurrence of uncertainty in a political event such as general election and political 
turnover. The chapter ends with a brief finding of all works of literature that related to 
the institutional investors and political risk. 
 
2.1 Review of the Theories and Empirical Works 
 At least two theoretical approaches have been adopted to identify the factors 
contributing to abnormal stock return from institutional investors during a political 
event. The theories identified are the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and Active 
and Passive Monitoring.  
 
2.1.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) introduced by Fama (1970) assume 
that financial market incorporated all publicly available information which then affect 
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the share price to reflect all relevant information. Correct information is vital to form 
a better expectation by investors. The more efficient the market, the more random 
sequence of price changes generated by the market which lead to the completely 
random and unpredictable price change in the stock market. In a competitive market, 
investors react quickly to the new information announced.  EMH is divided into three 
categories, which are strong form, semi-strong form and weak form. The strong form 
market indicates that the current market price will reflect all relevant information 
which includes both public and private information. In the semi-strong form, the 
market will reflect only on the publicly available information while in the weak form, 
market prices only reflect the information related to historical data or return sequence 
(historical price). Fama also emphasises that the ideal market is a market where the 
prices provide accurate signals to investors which make it easier for investors to 
allocate assets in their portfolio.   
 Further studies on EMH in Malaysia are conducted by Akinyote ( 2008),  
Baharuddin, Abdullahi and Teoh (2010) and Wong and Hooy (2016). In their research 
on the relationship between the announcement of dividends and stock prices, they 
found that the stock market in Malaysia is considered the semi-strong efficient market. 
This show that stock prices in Malaysia reflect all publicly available information as 
well as historical past information. The only way an investor can gain abnormal return 
when ones possessed internal information (Akinyote, 2008). Wong and Hooy (2016) 
also demonstrate the same result when they explore the impact of the General Election 
on Banks with government ownership. In contrast, Yusoff, Salleh, Ahmad and Idris 
(2015) found a weak form of market efficient in Malaysia when they study the impact 
of a short run political event on the stock return of companies connected to the bi-




2.1.2 Active Monitoring and Passive Monitoring 
 The function of institutional investors was described in the study by Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986) which highlight these investors’ role in active monitoring and 
passive monitoring. The active monitoring by institutional investors will be likely to 
result in improved firm performance because institutional investors are considered as 
large and sophisticated investors that can give incentive and expertise to monitor the 
management. The passive monitoring, in the other hand, is based on the argument that 
institutional investors might be the short term investors who are acting like common 
traders (holding or selling stocks according to their portfolio) instead of monitoring 
the management and improving the corporate governance in the firm. Bruton, 
Filatotchev, Salim and Wright (2010) in their study based on this view found that the 
IPO’s (Initial Public Offering) in UK and France performed better with concentrated 
ownership of private equity investors. However, the impact on performance is 
different depending on the type of private equity investors2. Elyasiani and Jia (2010), 
when looking at the stability of institutional ownership and firm performance found 
that stable institutional investors play an active role in monitoring the company. The 
pressure-insensitive3 institutional investors give more impact on firm performance as 
compared to pressure-sensitive4 investors. A view in a recent study on China by Lin 
and Fu (2017), an actively monitors institutional investors can minimise information 
asymmetry and agency problems thus enhancing firm performance. The institutional 
investors can make use of  their highly developed professional skills , managerial skills 
and voting right to influence the manager to make better business decision besides 
improving firm performance and corporate governance. In case of financing, the 
                                                 
2. In this study, there are two types of investors which is formal investors who are Venture Capitalist 
and informal investors, Business Angels.  
3 Example of pressure insensitive institutional investors include public pension funds and mutual funds 
4 Example of pressure sensitive institutional investors include insurers, bank, and nonblank trusts 
owning at least one per cent of the firm's stock  
 
 14 
institutional investors can provide funding or use their relationship with the related 
body to help the steady source financing whenever the firm need fund to expand. 
 
2.2 Institutional Investors and Firm’s Performance 
 In this past decade, few studies done in investigating the impact of institutional 
investors on firm performance. The result and effect are different depending on the 
concentration, ownership stability and type of institutional investors. 
  
2.2.1 Institutional Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance 
 The studies on the impact of ownership concentration by top holding on firm 
performance were well documented in various part of markets 
(Bruton,Filatothev,Chanine & Wright, 2010 ; Heugens, Essen & Oosterhout , 2009 ; 
Omran, Bolbol & Fatheldin, 2008 ; Ongore, 2011 ; Schmidt & Fahlenbranch , 2017 ; 
Vintila & Gherhina , 2014 ; Zeitun , 2009 ).  Most of the studies found that there was 
a positive relationship between top holdings concentration and firm performance 
except for Kenya (Ongore, 2011), Jordan (Zeitun,2009) Arab countries (Omran et al., 
2008). The performance of Kenya Public Listed Companies shows a low firm 
performance when there is a high concentration of top five shareholders or high 
government ownership. Similarly, Zeitun (2009) demonstrate a negative correlation 
between ownership concentration and firm performance in 167 Jordanian listed 
companies. In addition, government ownership also leads to the negative performance 
of the firm. Government ownership reduces the probability of default but negatively 
affect the firm's performance. The regression analysis of 304 firms from Egypt, 
Jordan, Oman and Tunisia shows no significant effect between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. The study by Kang and Kim (2012) use the fixed-
effect model on 6588 non-financial firm-year observations listed on the Shanghai 
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Stock Exchange, or Shenzhen Stock Exchange demonstrates that state-owned 
enterprise has better performance compared to government-owned firms. 
 Relevant studies conducted looking at institutional ownership does not only 
focus on government ownership. There are also studies that examined private 
institutional ownership on firm performance. Bruton et al. (2010) found that the 
concentrated ownership by private equity investors in the UK and France improves 
the performance of Initial Public Offering (IPO) companies. However, the impact 
would be different depending on the type of private equity investors. Heugens et al. 
(2009) in their study on Asia countries (India, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, and 
Taiwan) found a significantly low correlation between concentrated ownership and 
firm performance. The analysis using HOMA5, MARA6 and WLS (Weighted Least 
Squares) regression on 660,087 firm-year observation shows that there is a certain 
threshold level of institutional ownership concentration necessary to affect firm 
performance positively. On the broader range of study, Chen, Ghoul, Guedhami and 
Wang (2017) has conducted a cross-sectional regression covering 64 countries. They 
found that there is robust and strong evidence that investment inefficiency increases 
when there is an increased in government ownership and thus, weaken the firm 
performance. Likewise, Fereira and Matos (2008), previously has done the same 
method of analysis on 27 countries and found that the firm’s performance is better 
when there is a high number of foreign and independent institution compared to 
government holding. Vintila and Ghergina (2014) in their study on companies listed 
on the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE), found that only the second and third largest 
                                                 
5 HOMA is a meta-analytical procedure introduced by Hedged and Olkin. In HOMA there are two 
methods for combining study estimates. The first method utilises a fixed effects model, which assumes 
the absence of heterogeneity between study results while the second method employs random effects 
models ( Hedges & Olkin, 1985) 
6 MARA is a particular type of weighted least squares (WLS) regression analysis, which is explicitly 
designed to assess the relationship between effect size and moderator variables to model previously 
unexplored heterogeneity in the effect size distribution (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) 
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shareholding are positively influenced the firm's value. However, the third largest 
shareholder only give positive influence at the threshold of 13.8percent ownership. At 
below holding of the limit, it will negatively influence the firm's value.  
 
2.2.2  Institutional Ownership Stability and Firm Performance 
Besides ownership concentration and risk volatility, the stability of 
institutional ownership also has been well documented for these past decades. 
Bushee’s and Noe (2014) found that the temporary ownership in all firm rated by the 
Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) resulted in increased 
of the firm stock return volatility. Similarly, the companies listed in Russel 1000 and 
Russel 2000 indexes in the United States (US) shows negative firm performance 
whenever there is a change in ownership structure (Schmidt & Fahlenbrach, 2017). 
They also found that passive institutional ownership leads to lower agency cost by the 
firm. In the case of Taiwan, Hsu and Wang (2014) also found a positive impact 
between institutional holdings stability and firm performance using Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression on 647 sample companies. Elyasiani and Jane (2008), when 
looking at bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US, also found evidence that stable 
institutional ownership will result in positive BHC’s performance. Likewise, Elyasiani 
and Jia (2010), exhibit the same outcome for all firms in the US (except financial and 
public utility firm) using the simultaneous equation model. 
 
2.2.3 Institutional Ownership Type and Firm Performance 
Above all, looking at a comprehensive study on government ownership and 
firm performance, there is a mixed result recorded for this past decade. Interestingly, 
this direction of research has been done on the same market which is China. A recent 
study by Zhou (2017) shows a negative impact of government ownership on State 
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Owned Enterprise (SOE)'s return when there is a political event that happened. In 
contrast, other studies found a positive relationship between government ownership 
and firm performance in Chinese listed company (Yu, 2013; Tian & Saul, 2008). Both 
studies found that the link is U-shaped where up to a certain threshold, the corporate 
value decreases as shareholding by government increases, but, beyond the limit, the 
company value is increasing. 
 
2.3 Political Risk and Stock Market Performance 
 Studies on political risk for over the past decade has been extensively done 
from different aspect worldwide. The political risk constantly has been referred to the 
event that is related to politic such as general election and also political turnover. 
 
2.3.1 General election and Market Performance 
General election, uncertainty and political risk always co-exist in most 
countries (Belo, Gala and Li, 2013;  Chuang & Wang, 2010; Durnev,2010; 
Kim,Pantzalis &Park, 2012; Lehkonen & Heimonen, 2015; Li, Li & Xu, 2017;  Liu, 
Shu & Wei, 2017; Jens, 2017; Menge, 2013; Shen, Bui & Lin, 2017; Winiewski, 2016;  
Yusoff, Salleh, Ahmad and Idris, 2015). 
 Because political news and the general election is considered as an event, there 
are few numbers of studies has been conducted using event study methodology when 
analysing the impact of the general election on market performance. Bialkowski, 
Gottschalk and Wisniewski (2008) in their study on national polls in 27 industrialised 
nations, found that there are significant abnormal return increases on the election day 
and continue for another few days after. The market only settled down7 around 15 
                                                 
7 in this study referring to the situation when there is an increase in cumulative Abnormal Volatility 
(CAV). The computation of CAV is the same as standard event study methodology except for the 




trading days after the event. Similarly, Ramesh (2015) found the same evidence in 
India from May 2013 to June 2014 where there are a significantly high positive 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for 30 companies listed in S&P 
Bombay Stock Exchange Sensitive Index (BSE SENSEX). In the case of the 
government-owned bank in Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, Wong and Hooy 
(2016) show that the CAAR for government-owned banks is positively high 
significant compared to private owned bank during the election period. Opare (2008) 
found that the cumulative abnormal return (CAR)8 of MSCI Europe Index is positive 
during 15 days before the election and become negative following 15 days after the 
event. Moreover, the decline in the market is sharper than the rises of the period before 
the election and lasting more than 15 days. A recent study on the 2016 US election by 
Shaikh (2017) demonstrates an abnormal gain in FTSE100, Dow Jones Index, 
EuroStock50 and Nikkei 225 during the Republican party election.  
On the other hand, some studies found negative abnormal return using the same 
method. Yusoff, Salleh, Ahmad and Idris (2015), in their research on publicly listed 
company connected with the politician in Sarawak, Malaysia, found that the market 
reacts negatively upon the announcement of the political event9. The positive reaction 
recorded when there is a new election coming up. Likewise, Menge (2013) found that 
the stock return of Nairobi Security Exchange declined when there is an increasing 
political uncertainty during the election period. Chuang and Wang (2010) also 
recorded the same result when a study is conducted on major democratic countries 
(United State, Japan, the United Kingdom and France). They found that there is a 
negative abnormal return before the date of the general election announcement result, 
                                                 
8 The literature on CAR is also reviewed in this study since the primary purpose is to see whether there 
is abnormal return exists in the event of political risk or political change. CAR is the measure of 
cumulative abnormal return for one subject (for instance, index or one company) while for a larger 
sample, to capture all the abnormal return, CAAR is used when the cumulative abnormal return 
measured must consider all subject in the sample that resulted in an average abnormal return.  
9 Political events besides general election 
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6 and three days before announcement and 4, 6 and ten days after the announcement. 
Other studies found the inconsistent result when analysing the impact in Kenya 
(Kabiru, Ochieng & Kinyua, 2018) and the United States (Oehler, Walker & Wendt, 
2013). Both studies reported that the market reacts differently to the environment. 
However, in the US, the changes in the presidency from Republican to Democratic or 
vice versa, causes a stronger market reaction to compare with the re-election of the 
incumbent. 
 
2.3.2 Political Turnover and Market Performance 
 In terms of presidency change, most studies found significant effect on market 
performance (See for example Abidin, Old & Martin, 2010; Belo et. al, 2013; Chuang 
& Wang, 2009; Fuss & Bechtel, 2008; Goodell & Vahama, 2013; Jens, 2017; Oehler 
et.al, 2013; Savita, 2015; Shaikh, 2017; Wang, Lee & Lin, 2015; Wang & Lin, 2009; 
Wisniewski, 2016; Wong & McAleer, 2008). The result mostly depends on the 
winning party whether it is favors by the investors or otherwise.  Wong and Mc Aleer 
(2008) in their analysis on Standard & Poor’s 500 Composite Index found that stock 
price falls during the early stage of the presidential cycle. However, the stock price 
rises and reach the peak during the third or fourth year of a ruling by the Republican 
incumbent. Belo et al. (2013) found that the stock return of industrial firms in the US 
is higher during Democratic presidencies. Similarly, New Zealand also shows a 
different impact on NZX50 stock return with a different cycle of the ruling (either 
National party or Labour party) (Abidin et al., 2010). Jens (2017) reported that the 
firm in the US, reduced their investment by 5 percent to 15 percent owing to political 
uncertainty during the latest 8 Gubernatorial elections. There is also evidence that 




Wang and Lin (2009) in their study on Stock Exchange Value Weighted Index 
(TAIEX) return during different incumbent in Taiwan, found that stock return is 
negative during the election between congressional and democratic parties, but the 
stock returns volatility exists only during democratic elected. Moreover, the impact on 
the stock return is significantly higher when congressional take over the ruling after 
democratisation10. Chuang and Wang (2009) when looking at the significant 
democratic countries (United States, Japan, United Kingdom and France), reported 
that when there is a change in incumbent party, it will create great political party 
distress and resulted in falling of stock return. Wisniewski (2016) in his survey noted 
that when Democratic presidents were elected in the US, investors will start to 
discount their future cash flow which resulted in a drop of stock price. Shen et al. 
(2017) reported that firms benefitted from incumbent government policy would 
experience positive stock return. In the case of Malaysia, a recent study by Liew and 
Rowland (2016) said that there is a significant positive effect before the election, and 
after election on FBMKLCI for latest two general polls due to close fight between two 
major political parties11 in 2008 and 2013. Malaysia has been ruling by the same party, 
Barisan Nasional (BN) for the past 55 years. 
 Investment by the firm during election period mainly depend on the firm's 
expectation on the outcome. In China, the effect of political turnover is stronger in 
state-owned enterprises, capital intensive firms and firms that are locally important 
(Chen, Luo & Zhang, 2015; Sun, Tang & Wu, 2011). These firms will reduce their 
investment when there are political changes. During event day, state-owned 
                                                 
10 Taiwan, is previously ruled by Kuomintang (KMT) for 55 years, until democratic reforms in 1986, 
which led to the first-ever direct presidential election in 1996. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
won the presidential election in 2000 which end the congressional ruling. However, Taiwan has once 
again witnessed the transfer of power when congressional KMT won the presidential election in 2008 
(Kan, 2010) 
11 During this time, the government party was Barisan Nasional (BN) while the opposition party is 
Pakatan Rakyat (PR) 
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enterprise's stock performance earns more returns compared to a private firm (Zhou, 
2017). Similarly, African companies show that there is a reduction in investment 
whenever there is a political event occur (Asongu, 2012). Durnev (2010), in his 
observation on 47,808 firms from 79 countries found that investment by corporate is 
40 percent less sensitive to stock price during the year of election compared to a non-
election year. Mazol (2013) conducts a study on 52 developed countries using 
EGARCH model. The result shows that average stock return decreases in developed 
countries but increasing in developing countries during the pre-election period. 
However, developing countries do not show any changes in their stock return after the 
election period whereas developed countries stock return become lower in that period. 
The impact of the different party elected during the election also shows in a small firm 
(Fuss & Bechtel, 2008). In Germany, the small firm’s return is negatively linked to 
the probability of the left-leaning coalition winning. Liew and Rowland (2016), in 
their study using regression analysis, found that the stock return increased by 62.52 
percent soon after the announcement of the election result. The index also recorded 
the highest gain with 96.29 percent in the middle of intraday. In a comprehensive study 
by Li et al. (2017) covering the firms from countries listed in Worldscope, they found 
that the firm's stock is more likely to crash during the post-election period compared 
to before the election. Lehkonen and Heimonen (2015) also reported the parabolic 
relationship12 between stock return and democracy. In terms of volatility, Goodell and 
Vahama (2013) found that the VIX volatility index13 of monthly IOWA Electronic 
market14 increases along with the positive changes on the success probability of 
                                                 
12 Parabolic to refer to the positive relationship between variables until it reaches a certain threshold; 
the result becomes inverse. In this study, there is a threshold level of democracy after which political 
risk begins to decline. 
13 VIX is index volatility that is measured and introduced by CBOE Global Market as a benchmark 
index to estimate the market's expectation of future volatility. It is based on the option of the S&P Index 
(CBOE, 2019) 
14, The Iowa Electronic Markets is a futures market run for research and teaching purposes. Traders can 
buy and sell real-money contracts based on their belief about the outcome of an election or other events. 
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eventual winner. Also, America and Europe show there are at higher risks in terms of 
volatility in stock and foreign exchange market compare to another region (Vortelinos 
& Saha, 2016). However, political risk recorded having more significant influence in 
other areas compared to Europe. In the case of Malaysia, the stock volatility is higher 
during the pre-general election period (Jiun, 2018). Moreover, Jiun found that the 
volatility of Shariah-compliant indices and stock index with higher market 
capitalisation is lower during the post-election period.  
 Political uncertainty seems to generate an unstable financial market and more 
pronounced stock market cycles (Mnif, 2017). The presidential political orientation, 
election cycle, approval rating and military conflict also significantly give impact on 
the stock market (Winiewski, 2009). In terms of stock return, the effect can be seen in 
IOWA15 (Majumder, Diermeiera, Rietzc & Amaral, 2008), United States (Kim, 
Pantzalis & Park, 2012), and in other 50 countries (Lehkonen & Heimonen, 2015). 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 From all the literature reviewed, we can sum up that the stock return was 
affected by the various economic variable with different direction whether positive, 
negative, or no effect. In these studies, institutional ownership concentration, 
ownership stability and institutional investors’ type besides political event. 
  Even though a vast amount of studies is done on the impact of stock market 
performance during the political event and general election, most studies have been 
focusing on the developed countries and major democratic countries such as United 
States, Japan, United Kingdom and France. Most countries has a poll to predict the 
real election outcome which is beneficial to investors during the election period. In 
                                                 
Using this "wisdom of crowds," the price of a deal at any given time is a forecast of the outcome 
(IEM,2019) 
15 IOWA here referring to IOWA electronic market with the electronic presidential election. For the 
definition of IOWA electronic market, refer to footnote (12) 
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terms of methodology, an event study is widely used when capturing the impact of the 
political event. 
 Institutional investors, on the other hand also recorded great impact on stock 
market performance. The result would be different depending on the ownership 
concentration, ownership stability and institutional type. For this past decade, only 
two studies investigate the relationship between government ownership and firm 
performance on the individual country which in Jordan and China. The same situation 
can be seen when looking at the impact of both variables on stock market performance 
(government institutional investors and political event), especially in Asia. The 
country that has been highlighted was China and Taiwan. Most literature that includes 
ASEAN countries only investigate the relationship of the political event on stock 
market performance. The most related study was done in 2016 to analyse the impact 
of the general election on the government-owned bank in three countries namely 
Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. To this date, none in the author’s knowledge has 
been investigating the impact of the general election on the firm with government 
institutional holding in a single country.  
 The next chapter develops the underlying framework of the thesis to address 








This paper examines the political impact on Malaysia capital market. The 
primary objective is to find out if the stock prices of the company with institutional 
holdings in Bursa Malaysia16 have abnormal return during 12th, 13th, and 14th Malaysia 
General Election. This research employs daily adjusted prices of individual 
companies. The 42 companies’ daily stock return was used as a proxy of expected 
market return of Malaysia. Section 3.2 explained the sample selection used for this 
study followed by theoretical framework in section 3.3. The methodology and 
hypothesis development are briefly explained in section 3.4. The sample period being 
examined is from 15 February 2007 until 8 August 2018. Three elections happened 
during this period in Malaysia. The dates of election during the examined period are 
shown in Table 3.1 below. 
 
Table 3.2  
Election dates for Malaysia between 8 March 2007 to 08 August 2018 
Source: own compilation based on information from Election Commission of Malaysia 
  
As for methodology, the event study methodology proposed by Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen and Roll (1969) is applied in conducting this study. The method will closely 
follow the modification made by Kabiru et al. (2018), Savita (2015), Wang et al. 
                                                 
16 Bursa Malaysia is the stock exchange in Malaysia 
 Election date 
12th general election 8 March 2008 
13th general election 5 May 2013 
14th general election 9 May 2018 
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(2015) and Wong and Hooy (2016). The data was obtained from Datastream to 
calculate the daily stock return while for econometric analysis, the Microsoft Excel 
tools and Stata software is used. 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
This research deals entirely with secondary data. The information of companies 
with GLICs holding is collected from the annual report of 7 Malaysia GLICs17. The 
information of Malaysian GLICs is available on the Ministry of Finance Malaysia 
website18. The list of the company with each GLICs holdings is available in the 
Appendix A. Out of 440 companies found, only 63 is Malaysia public listed 
company19. The final 42 companies were selected for this study when another 21 is 
rejected due to the criteria below:  
1. There is no daily stock data available during 12th,13th or 14th Malaysia general 
election within the study period  
2. There is no institutional holding information available during 12th, 13th or 14th 
Malaysia general election during the study period.  
The criteria mentioned above in the finalized sample size is summarized in 




                                                 
17 Namely Minister of Finance (Incorporated), Khazanah Nasional Berhad, Employee Provident Fund 
(EPF), Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH), Armed Forces Fund Board (LTAT), Retirement Fund 
(Incorporated) and Permodalan Nasional Berhad 
18 Official portal of Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 
http://www.treasury.gov.my/index.php/en/contactus/faqs/gic.html 




Table 3.3  
Sample Selection Process for firms with government institutional ownership 
Company  Total 
All public listed company in Bursa Malaysia20  933 
All company with government institutional holdings (from 7 GLICs 
2018 annual report)  440 
Less:   
Private company 377  
Unavailability of stock data during 12th, 13th, and 14th GE 18  
Unavailability of ownership data during 12th, 13th, and 14th 
general elections  3  
Total Final Firms  42 
 
 
As for the market return, FBMKLCI21 daily data is used following the method 
used by Liew and Rowland (2016) and Wong and Hooy (2016). 
 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
There are two main objectives of this study. The first objective is to examine 
market reaction following general election result announcement. This objective is met 
by measuring the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) in the short event 
windows. Two announcement dates during 6 (0, +5) and 11 (0, +10) event windows 
are selected as the dependent variable because the return has shown signs in the 
previous study (Wong & Hooy, 2016). The CAAR (0, +5) and (0, +10) will then be 
used in the regression model to test the effects of the independent variable in the 
second objective. Objective two has four independent variables which are, Ownership 
(IO), Size (SIZE), leverage (LEVERAGE) and profitability (ROA). These variables 
                                                 
20 The information available from Bursa Malaysia at March 2019. 
21 FBMKLCI also known as FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI that comprises 30 largest companies in the 
main board (Bursa Malaysia, 2019) 
 
 27 
will be regressed by using ordinary least square (OLS). The relationship is 





Relationship between Independent Variables and Dependent Variables 
 
 
3.3 Methodology and Hypothesis Development 
There were few methodologies found that could be used in testing the hypothesis 
for this study. The main method used to find short run abnormal return effect is event 
study methodology. As for measuring the relationship between control variables and 
cumulative average abnormal return, standard regression using OLS analysis is 
conducted to run the analysis. 
The computation of the hypothesis for this study is based on the theories found 
in Chapter Two. There were two theories related to general election and institutional 
ownership. The first theory is based on the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). The 













3.3.1 Short Run Abnormal Return Effect 
The event study methodology proposed by Fama et al. (1969) has been used 
broadly in finance research to measure investors' reaction towards various scope of 
events like right announcements, new issuance of equity, merger and acquisition and 
also political news such as an election. There have been several discussion and 
improvement made on event- study methodology to improve and improvise it. Some 
notable literature is by Brown and Warner (1985), Henderson (1990) and Thompson 
(1985). The event study is based on the assumption of efficient market information 
where the stock prices should immediately reflect all the publicly available 
information. As an approach, it is considered a reputable method to measure the 
impact of the specific event on stock return.  
This study employs the market model (MM) and market adjusted return (MAR) 
where the expected return of stock i at event day t is presumed to be equal to the market 
return. These models have been proven to yield a valid result (Wong & Hooy, 2016). 
The simulation by Brown and Warner (1985) when using daily return as compared to 
monthly return introduced by Fama et al. (1969) demonstrate that all the three 
elements of market models, mean-adjusted and market adjusted are regularly used 
because they have equal capability to identify abnormal stock performance. The MM 
uses estimation period to deduct the expected return during event windows day while 
MAR uses market return to find the difference between market return and stock return 
as abnormal return during event window period. The MM has been widely used since 
it uses historical information to find the stock expected return on present day. The 
MAR could be useful as robustness check since it considers the current market 
reaction in order to recognize any abnormal return of a stock. 
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The window study period will be 20 pre-event days, event day and 60 post-event 
day following study by Wong and Hooy (2016) because they found that the market in 
Malaysia is inefficient. In their view, in an inefficient market, stock prices tend to 
overreact or under-react. Under this situation, the market will take longer time to react 
to the news22. Thus, in this study, the 81- day event window is used. Trading days 
prior to the announcement of general election result are numbered -1, -2, -3 and so on; 
event day is the first trading day when the market is open after the announcement, is 
numbered event day 0 (!"); and event days following the result announcement are 
numbered +1, +2, +3 and so on. Following study by Brown and Warner (1985) and 
references from Kimberly and Phyllis (2014), the estimation window in this study will 
use the maximum value of 250 days which is a one-year trading day before the event. 
-270 to -20 estimation window was set as an earlier observation to estimate the 
intercept, a and slope, b for each company stock prices. The illustration of this study 












                                                 
22 This statement has been viewed by Wong and Hooy (2016) from literature by Bond & Thaler (1985) 
Estimation window Pre-event window Post-event window 
t =-270 t=0 t =-20  t =+60 
Figure 3.3 
Illustration of the study period used in this study 
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Based on the information on election date available from Election Commission of 
Malaysia (refer Table 3.1), the study period for each general election is shown in 
























Estimation window Pre-event window Post-event window 
15/2/2007 
10/3/2008 (event day) 
11/2/2008 5/6/2008 
Figure 3.4  
Study period during 12th general election 
Estimation window Pre-event window Post-event window 
23/4/2012 
6/5/2013 (event day) 
5/4/2013 30/7/2013 
Figure 3.5  














To test the hypothesis #"$ , the market model from event study methodology is used 
to estimate the average abnormal return (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal 
return (CAAR). The abnormal return of the share price will be the indicator of the 
effect  of the event ( announcement of general election result). The abnormal return is 
measured by calculating the differences between the actual stock return and the stock’s 
expected return during the period without event. The equation model to estimate the 
abnormal return is illustrated in equation (3.1) below: 
 
&'( = 	+' +	-'	&.( +	/'(                                                                                (3.1) 
 
Where, 
&'( = ln 2 34,5
34,567
8 =	The change of stock i’s price (9') on day t 
+' = Average rate of stock return by firm i realized in period t with zero 
market return (intercept) 
Estimation window Pre-event window Post-event window 
26/4/2017 
14/5/2018 (event day) 
11/4/2018 1/8/2018 
Figure 3.6  
Study period during 14th general election 
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-' = The sensitivity of stock i to the market return (slope) 
&.( = ln ; <5
<567
= =	The change of market index (>)	on day t (the market 
return on day t) 
/'( = The part of stock’s return resulting from firm-specific events. 
 
 
Once the model is estimated, the parameter +' and -'	is using to generate 
expected return of a firm during event day. The value of +' and -'	 in this study is 
measured during estimation period of -255 until -5 for each event of general election. 
The model is expressed in equation (3.2) below: 
 
   ?(&'() = 				 +' 		+ 			-'	&.(																																																																																				(3.2)	
 
Where ?(&'() is the expected return of firm i during event day. Once ?(&'() is 
obtained, it will be compared to the actual return of the firm i during the event day. 
The difference between expected return ?(&'() and actual return &'( is known as 
abnormal return. The residual, ARit represents the measure of abnormal performance 
of a stock	D	.  The model to express this abnormal return is shown in equation (3) 
below: 
  
EF'( 	= 		 &'( 		− 		?(&'()                                                                                  (3.3) 
 
Where EF'( is the abnormal return of firm i at time t. If a stock is not traded 
on a certain event day, the abnormal return on that particular day is equal to zero. The 













&',H = Average daily returns of stock i during the non-trading period 
9',KLM = Stock i’s adjusted price in the last trading day before the non-
trading period 
9',K = Stock i’s adjusted price the first trading day after the non-trading 
period 
!',H = The number of days during the non-trading period of stock i plus 
the first trading day after the non-trading period 
 
 
To draw the overall inference for the event, the AR need to be aggregate 
(MacKinlay, 1997). The aggregate process is deducted into two stages. First, 
aggregation across firms which resulted in average abnormal return (AAR). The 
second stage is the aggregation of the AAR across time which results in cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR). The computation of AAR and CAAR is illustrated 
in equation (4) and (5) below:  
 
 EEF( = 	 ;
M
P
= /'(                                                                                           (3.4) 
 
Where, 
J = Number of firms in the sample 
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EEF( = Average abnormal return at time t 
 
QEEF = ∑ EEF(	S(TM 							                                                                                          (3.5)     
 
Where CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal return and T is some number 
of event days before day t. At this point, the information gained will be enough to 
determine whether the general election has an impact on the stock return of companies 
with government institutional holding. The null hypothesis to be tested is: 
 
#"
$ 		 ∶ ?(QEEF) = 0                                                                                       (3.6) 
 
In other words, the general election has no impact on the stock return of the 
company with government institutional ownership. However, the statistically 
significant of AAR and CAAR need to be tested. The significant test can be prepared 
by computing the t-statistics. The simple t-statistic for AAR is the ratio of EEF( to its 
estimated standard deviation, s (EEF(). In this study, the estimated standard deviation 
is measured over the day -255 to -5 representing 250 days estimation window. The t-





                                                                                    (3.7) 
 
For CAAR, the estimation of standard deviation will follow Wong and Hooy 
(2016) where the computation of CAAR t-statistic is as below: 
 
!(QEEF) 		= 				 ZWWX	((7,([)
Y((7,([	)




Where \](!M, !]) = 		^	\(EEF() 
 
 ^ is the horizon length of the event period. 
 
 To make the analysis robust, Market Adjusted Return (MAR) is also utilized 
in this event study. It starts by computing the daily abnormal returns (AR) as follows: 
 
EF',( = 		 &',( − 	&.,(               (3.9) 
 
_ℎ/&/, 
EF',( = Abnormal returns for stock i on day t 
&',( = ln 2 34,5
34,567
8 =	The change of stock i’s price (9') on day t 
&.( = ln ; <5
<567
= =	The change of market index (>)	on day t (the market 
return on day t) 
 
 
 The second step is to compute the daily cross-sectional average abnormal 
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 The final step is to calculate the sum of cross-sectional average abnormal 
returns to compute cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for event day t as 
below: 
 
QEEF( 		= 			∑ EEF(
(
bT(LS                              (3.11) 
T = Some number of event days prior to day t 
 
To test the null hypothesis (average abnormal returns on event day t is equal 
to zero), the t-statistic is calculated to see whether there is the significant change in 
stock prices due to the announcement of the general election result. The t-statistic for 












and i = 1,2,3, …, J( 
 
The null hypothesis that the CAAR over T days is equal to zero is tested using 
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and t = 1,2,3, …, T 
 
QEEFS is the Cumulative average abnormal returns over the T- day interval.                                                                         
3.1.1 Regression analysis 
Besides event study, another analysis used as a robustness check is regression 
analysis. The dependent variable used in regression is CAAR which obtained from the 
previous analysis. Even though most studies use ROI (Return on Investment) and 
leverage as the dependent variable, it is appropriate to use CAAR as the dependent 
variable in this study because the objective is to see the response of company with 
government institutional holding during the election in terms of stock return (Wong & 
Hooy, 2016). The dependent variables following Wong and Hooy (2016) will be CAR 
(0,5) and CAR (0,10). This research controls the effect of firm characteristics such as 
the percentage of institutional holding, firm size, leverage, and firm performance. The 
proxy for institutional holding is Institutional ownership (IO), Size is Total Assets 
(SIZE), Leverage is total liabilities over total assets (LEVERAGE), and performance 
is Return on Assets (ROA). The model for this control variable is shown as follows: 
 
QEF = o +	-Mpq +	-]cpr? +	-sI?t?FEu?	 +	-vFqE                   (3.16) 
 
Where, 




pq = Percentage of the total number of outstanding shares held by 
the top 10 institutional investors 
cpr? = The logarithm of the log value of total assets 
I?t?FEu? = The ratio of the book value of total liabilities to the book value 
of total assets. 
FqE  = Profit divided by book value of assets 
 
All the measurement and control variable used is following literature by Lin 
and Fu (2017) except for IO (Institutional Ownership), the computation of IO is based 
on the studies by Chen et. al (2013), Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Kang and Kim 
(2012) where the total percentage of institutional ownership consists of top 10 
institutional investors in the firm. All variables were measured at the end of the 
respective election quarter following a study by Barinov (2017) and Schmidt and 
Fahlenbranch (2017).  
 
3.3.2 Determinant of Variables 
The dependent variable for this study is the cumulative abnormal return. One 
group of independent variables and four control variables are identified for the purpose 
of empirically testing the hypothesis. The group of independent variables consists of 
42 companies which all have government holding in their shares. All companies are 
listed in Bursa Malaysia during the 12th, 13th and 14th Malaysia general election. The 
company characteristic in relation to size, profitability, gearing, and percentage of 
institutional holdings are included as control variables in this study. All variables in 
this study are secondary data extracted from DataStream. The sample period is from 
8 March 2007 until 8 August 2018. A final sample of 42 companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia is selected for the empirical test of all hypothesis.  
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3.3.3 Hypothesis Development 
a) Abnormal Return During General Election 
Based on studies by Akinyote (2008) and Baharuddin et. Al (2010) , the 
Malaysia stock market is a semi-strong efficient market. All stock prices in Bursa 
Malaysia reflected on all publicly available information. As such, logic will dictate it 
is impossible for investors to gain benefit from the abnormal return. Given the 
situation where the announcement of the general election result is publicly announced, 
the stock market in Malaysia will reflect right away on the announcement. Wong and 
Hooy (2016) study support this argument when they found that the government-owned 
bank in Malaysia appears to have a significant positive stock return after the 
announcement of the election result. The market value of government-owned banks 
also influenced by the election result in the short run. However, in terms of abnormal 
return, government-owned banks exhibit high and significant Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Return (CAAR) during their study period compare to privately owned 
banks. 
This finding leads to the hypothesis as below: 
 
#M 			 ∶		 
 
 
b) Government Institutional Ownership and Abnormal Return 
The concept of active monitoring and passive monitoring by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986) when explaining the role of institutional investors is used to deduct the next 
hypothesis for this study. Active monitoring will positively influence firm 
performance because actively monitors institutional investors can minimize agency 
There is a significant abnormal return of government-owned company 




problems  and information asymmetry besides enhance firm performance (Lin  & Fu, 
2017). They also believed that the institutional investors could make use of  their 
highly professional skills ,managerial skills and voting right to influence the manager 
to make better business decision besides improving firm performance and corporate 
governance. In case of financing, the institutional investors can provide funding or use 
their relationship with a related body to help the firm source financing whenever the 
firm need fund to expand. Besides, among other reasons, institutional investors can 
enhance shareholder’s value by attracting more analyst while reducing insider 
ownership.  
On the other hand, passive monitoring is based on the argument that institutional 
investors might be the short term investors who are acting like common traders23 
instead of monitoring the management and improving the corporate governance in the 
firm (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). If there is passive monitoring exists in a firm, it is 
expected that there will be weak or no relationship between firm performance and 
institutional ownership. However, most studies found a positive relationship which 
indicates that the institutional investors posit active monitoring in the firm ( Bruton et 
al. , 2010: Elyasiani & Jia, 2010: Lin & Fu, 2017). In the case of Malaysia, Wong and 
Hooy (2016) found that Government-owned bank in Malaysia shows a highly 
significant positive reaction in stock return during the election period.  
This finding leads to the hypothesis as below: 
 
 
#] 			 ∶		 
 
 
                                                 
23 holding or selling stocks according to their portfolio just to generate profit for trading. 
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c) Firm’s Size and Abnormal Return 
Wong and Hooy (2016) found that there is a negative relationship between stock 
returns and firm size in Malaysia and Indonesia during the 2000- 2013 general 
elections. They conclude that the larger the size of the firm will result in the lower 
abnormal return. The same result was observed by Belghitar et al. (2011) when 
looking at the US firms listed in New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX) and Nasdaq. Similarly, large firms in China with institutional 
ownership also exhibit worse market performance compared to other firms (Lin & Fu, 
2017). Aloui and Jarboui (2017) emphasize that the negative relationship between a 
firm's size and stock return is caused by deterioration in the monitoring ability during 
a crisis which reduced investor's confidence in firms. This cause also incorporated 
with poor corporate governance in the firm. Besides, there is also evidence that in the 
emerging market, the momentum effects such as stocks returns are primarily driven 
by small stocks (Cakici et al., 2013). Furthermore, Fu (2009) in his study highlighted 
Merton’s prediction on “size effect” where idiosyncratic risk and investor's behavior 
controls the impact of a firm's size. 
These findings lead to the hypothesis as below: 
 
#sK 			 ∶		  
 
 
d) Firm’s Leverage and Abnormal Return 
Leverage was used continuously as an independent variable whenever there is 
study involved with firm performance. It was known that leverage is measured as a 
risk for a firm. Most studies found that leverage is negatively impacting firm 
performance (Elyasiani,2008; Lin & Fu, 2017; Liu et al., 2017; Wong & Hooy, 2016). 
There is a significant relationship between abnormal stock return and the 




However, some studies found a positive relationship between leverage and firm 
performance under a few circumstances. Belghitar et al. (2011) found that firms with 
low growth opportunity have a positive leverage effect on firm performance while 
Yuan & Xiao (2008) study also demonstrate the same result on small firms. A more 
substantial period of study on a single country which is the US by Oehler et al. (2013) 
also found that the higher leverage by a firm with institutional ownership during 
general election exhibit better firm performance.  
On the other hand, Chen et al. (2013) when looking at different type of 
institutional ownership, found that firms with high foreign institution ownership 
resulted in positive firm performance when considering leverage as a control variable. 
The adverse effect of leverage on stock returns is well explained by Cai and Zhang 
(2011) when looking at the debt overhang theory by Myers. The theory suggests that 
the higher leverage increases the probability of a firm obtaining a positive NPV project 
in the future. The payoff, however, is expected to be shared with shareholders only 
after fulfilling the debt obligation. This is the situation said to be under-investment 
situation which reduces the growth opportunity of the firm and thus, increasing the 
debt will result in lower stock price. Modigliani and Miller (1958) as a pioneer in this 
study stated that the financial leverage is considered as equity risk which directly 
affects stocks return and indirectly affect business risk in influencing the investment 
decision. Thus, this finding leads to the hypothesis as below:  
 
#sw 			 ∶		  
 
 
e) Firm’s Profitability and Abnormal Return 
Wong and Hooy (2016) in their review emphasis that a government-owned firm 
usually has better stock returns on average. This is due to the capital controls 





implemented by the government. Further, using the fixed effect model regression with 
ROA as a control variable, they found that more profitable firms have a higher stock 
return. However, in terms of the different political cycle, Belo et al. (2013) found that 
firms with high government exposure have high future profitability and stock returns 
during Democratic presidential terms, while the opposite holds during Republican 
presidential terms in the US. In the case of semi-strong form market efficiency, it is 
expected that there will be adverse effects on the firm's profit which should be 
incorporated in today stock's price (Fuss & Bechtel, 2008). Past studies also 
highlighted that investors should be cautious during pre-general election periods in 
Malaysia as their profits are underlie in high volatility and compensation for abnormal 
returns is small during this time (Chian & Jiun, 2018). Based on this, it can be 
concluded that the last hypothesis is as below: 
 
#sx 			 ∶		  
 
 
3.4 Summary  
In this chapter, the population chooses as the target population is public 
companies with government institutional holdings in Bursa Malaysia. Out of 440 
companies, 42 final companies have been used in this study. Market Model form event 
study methodology was chosen as a method of analysis. All the data used is secondary 
data collected from DataStream. The frequency for stock return in event study is daily 
stock return while for control variable regression analysis, the frequency used is 
quarterly data. The window period of the event is 81 days with an estimation period 
of 250days. The study is performed to find out if the stock returns of the 42 companies 
exhibit abnormal return during 12th, 13th, and 14th Malaysia general election. 
  
There is a significant relationship between abnormal stock return and the 









This chapter discusses the findings after computing the analysis of the relationship 
between a firm's with institutional ownership and abnormal return. The first section of 
the chapter illustrates preliminary results from the descriptive statistics of each 
independent and control variables. The next section explains the presence of abnormal 
return of firm's with institutional holdings during the general election to test the 
hypothesis one, #M	(There is a significant abnormal return of government-owned 
company during 12th,13th and 14th general election). The third section analyzes the 
data whether the distribution is normal and also examines whether there is 
multicollinearity, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity problem exist before 
analyzing the regression model. The last section interprets the findings of regression 
analysis whether the result is consistent with other hypotheses developed in chapter 
three which is as below: 
 
#] 			 ∶		 
 
 












There is a significant relationship between abnormal stock return and 
institutional investors ownership. 
 There is a significant relationship between abnormal stock return and the 
Firm's size 
 There is a significant relationship between abnormal stock return and 
Firm’s leverage 





4.1  Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive analysis is vital to understand the fundamental characteristic of the 
data. Table 4.1 below shows the descriptive statistics of all variables in terms of mean, 
median, maximum value, minimum value and standard deviation for the entire sample 
from 2008 until 2018. The sample consists of 42 public listed companies with 
government institutional holdings.  
 
Table 4.4 
The result of Descriptive Statistics for Each Variable of 42 Public Firms with 
Government Institutional Holdings in 2008-2018 
Variables 
Non-Bank (36) Bank24(6) 




Ownership (%) 0.571 0.973 0.000 0.325 0.582 0.907 0.007 0.312 
Total Assets 
(RM Million) 6.452 144.209 0.150 20.210 209.240 764.442 27.476 197.008 
Debt-Assets 0.213 0.584 0.050 0.162 0.109 0.175 0.022 0.045 
ROA 0.056 0.455 -0.415 0.095 0.010 0.014 0.006 0.002 
  
As reported above, the average institutional ownership is about 57 percent for 
non-bank and 58 percent for the bank with a standard deviation of 32 percent and 31 
percent respectively. This indicates that there is a low dispersion in the composition 
of the top 10 institutional ownership of Malaysia's public firms. In profound 
observation at the individual firm's institutional ownership, the maximum value of the 
top 10 institutional ownership is 97 percent which is by Bintulu Port Holdings Bhd 
                                                 
24 Banks and non-banks are separated because of a high difference in total assets and computation of 
Debt-Assets. According to Word scope DataStream, Debt-Assets for non-bank is (Short Term Debt + 
Current Portion of Long Term Debt + Long Term Debt)/(Total Assets) while for the bank, Debt-Assets 
is (Short Term Debt + Current Portion of Long Term Debt + Long Term Debt?/(Total Assets – 
Customer Liabilities on Acceptance). 
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during second quarter 2018. The least amount of institutional ownership for these past 
years is 0 percent25.  
For the total assets of all firms in the sample, banks recorded higher value of total 
assets with average of RM209 millions with a standard deviation of RM 197 million 
compared to non-bank which its total assets in average are RM 6.452 million with 
high dispersion of RM 20.210 million standard deviation.  The most top total asset is 
RM764.442 million which is by Malayan Banking Berhad during the second quarter 
of 2018. Meanwhile, the lowest total asset is from CCM Duopharma Biotech Bhd 
which is RM 0.150 million during the second quarter of 2008.  In terms of Debt-Assets 
(leverage), the average value for non-bank firms is higher than banks which is 0.213 
with 0.162 standard deviations. MMC Corporation reports the maximum leverage in 
the second quarter of 2008 with Debt-Assets value of 0.584. The lowest leverage is 
0.05 which is recorded by PPB Group Bhd in the second quarter of 2013.  
As for Return on Assets (ROA) or profitability, the average value is about 0.05 
with a standard deviation of 0.095 for non-banks an average of 0.010 with a standard 
deviation of 0.002 for banks. The distribution of profitability in the non-banks is high 
compared to banks. The maximum ROA recorded is by Digi. Com Bhd during 2013 
with the value of 0.455. On the other hand, the lowest amount of ROA reported is -
0.4145 which is from Media Prima Bhd during the second quarter of 2018.  
 Figure 4.1 below shows the movement of the average stock returns of public 
firms with government institutional investors in Malaysia around the respective 
election period from the year 2008 until 2018. As can be observed in the graph, the 
average stock returns after the announcement of election result (t+1) are the highest in 
average with a return of 0.016 while the lowest return was marked on election day (t 
                                                 
25 which is by CCM Duopharma, TIME Dot Com Bhd, TH Plantation, Syarikat Takaful Malaysia 
Berhad, MBM Resources Berhad, Genting Plantation Berhad, Media Prima Bhd, KPJ Healthcare 
Berhad, Cahya Mata Sarawak Bhd and Bintulu Port Holding Bhd during second quarter 2008 
 
 47 
0) with an average value of -0.02. Another obvious result seems to occur during day t 
+10 where the average return is second higher after the election. In general, the 
average returns of the sample firms is observed to be stable with up and down trend in 
the remaining window period. 
 
 
Figure 4.7  
The average stocks returns of public firms with government institutional holdings in 





4.2  Presence of Abnormal Return During Election 
Table 4.2, 4.4 and 4.6 shows the average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) for the sample period during 12th, 13th and 14th 
general election using market model (MM) and market adjusted return (MAR) while 
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Table 4.5  
AAR and CAAR of firms with government institutional holdings 20 days before the 
election and 60 days after the election during the 12th general election 
Day MM MAR AAR t-value CAAR t-value AAR t-value CAAR t-value 
t-20 -0.011 -0.775 -0.011 0.000 -0.011 -0.126 -0.011 -0.126 
t-19 0.001 0.028 -0.010 -1.253 0.001 0.005 -0.010 -1.239 
t-18 -0.007 -0.205 -0.017** -2.358 -0.007 -0.030 -0.016** -2.326 
t-17 -0.002 -0.139 -0.019** -2.627 -0.002 -0.021 -0.019** -2.604 
t-16 0.000 0.023 -0.019** -2.225 0.001 0.007 -0.018** -2.116 
t-15 0.002 0.163 -0.017* -1.684 0.003 0.026 -0.015 -1.528 
t-14 -0.005 -0.261 -0.021** -2.158 -0.005 -0.038 -0.020* -1.984 
t-13 -0.001 -0.069 -0.023** -2.283 -0.001 -0.007 -0.021** -2.058 
t-12 -0.001 -0.020 -0.023** -2.298 0.000 0.000 -0.021* -2.008 
t-11 0.001 0.056 -0.022** -2.097 0.002 0.012 -0.019* -1.749 
t-10 -0.009 -0.368 -0.031** -2.528 -0.009 -0.054 -0.028** -2.199 
t-9 0.004 0.143 -0.027* -1.942 0.004 0.023 -0.024 -1.672 
t-8 0.000 -0.016 -0.027* -1.961 0.000 -0.001 -0.024 -1.678 
t-7 0.000 0.027 -0.027* -1.900 0.001 0.007 -0.023 -1.595 
t-6 0.011 0.350 -0.016 -0.837 0.011 0.056 -0.012 -0.605 
t-5 0.005 0.301 -0.010 -0.526 0.006 0.052 -0.006 -0.274 
t-4 -0.002 -0.082 -0.012 -0.603 -0.001 -0.008 -0.007 -0.323 
t-3 0.003 0.124 -0.009 -0.446 0.004 0.023 -0.003 -0.131 
t-2 -0.006 -0.405 -0.015 -0.727 -0.006 -0.062 -0.009 -0.420 
t-1 -0.001 -0.050 -0.016 -0.790 -0.001 -0.006 -0.010 -0.467 
t-0 0.006 0.129 -0.010 -0.455 0.009 0.017 -0.001 -0.041 
t+1 -0.001 -0.052 -0.011 -0.523 -0.002 -0.009 -0.003 -0.123 
t+2 -0.001 -0.047 -0.013 -0.575 -0.001 -0.009 -0.004 -0.184 
t+3 0.001 0.037 -0.012 -0.539 0.002 0.011 -0.003 -0.114 
t+4 -0.005 -0.186 -0.017 -0.770 -0.005 -0.027 -0.008 -0.325 
t+5 -0.005 -0.232 -0.022 -0.975 -0.004 -0.026 -0.012 -0.501 
t+6 0.004 0.111 -0.018 -0.784 0.004 0.018 -0.008 -0.324 
t+7 -0.005 -0.265 -0.023 -0.988 -0.005 -0.041 -0.013 -0.519 
t+8 0.003 0.197 -0.020 -0.833 0.004 0.032 -0.009 -0.371 
t+9 0.006 0.374 -0.014 -0.559 0.006 0.058 -0.003 -0.120 
t+10 0.016 0.728 0.002 0.065 0.016 0.104 0.013 0.416 
t+11 -0.007 -0.177 -0.005 -0.153 -0.007 -0.029 0.006 0.185 
t+12 -0.010 -0.328 -0.014 -0.456 -0.010 -0.049 -0.004 -0.126 
t+13 0.001 0.056 -0.013 -0.409 0.002 0.009 -0.003 -0.079 
t+14 -0.012 -0.392 -0.025 -0.748 -0.012 -0.060 -0.015 -0.423 
t+15 0.003 0.130 -0.022 -0.651 0.004 0.023 -0.011 -0.319 
t+16 -0.011 -0.625 -0.033 -0.926 -0.010 -0.096 -0.022 -0.593 
t+17 0.000 0.034 -0.032 -0.913 0.001 0.009 -0.021 -0.569 
t+18 0.010 0.512 -0.023 -0.610 0.010 0.090 -0.010 -0.275 
t+19 0.002 0.137 -0.021 -0.556 0.002 0.024 -0.008 -0.215 
t+20 0.004 0.289 -0.017 -0.458 0.004 0.045 -0.004 -0.115 
t+30 -0.004 -0.177 -0.012 -0.250 -0.004 -0.026 0.002 0.032 
t+40 0.005 0.240 -0.005 -0.099 0.005 0.038 0.011 0.191 
t+50 -0.004 -0.290 -0.031 -0.523 -0.004 -0.042 -0.013 -0.220 




Table 4.6   
CAAR of firms with government institutional holdings in different window period 
during the 12th general election 
(0 to +5)  -0.006 -0.718   -0.002 -0.208 
(0 to +10)  0.018 0.934   0.023 1.144 
(0 to +20)  -0.001 -0.022   0.006 0.181 
(0 to +30)  0.004 0.096   0.012 0.261 
(0 to +40)  0.011 0.217   0.021 0.405 
(0 to +50)  -0.015 -0.270   -0.003 -0.061 
(0 to +60)  -0.032 -0.518   -0.017 -0.320 
A superscript *, ** or *** indicates significance at 10 percent,5 percent or 1 percent 
confidence level, respectively 
 
12th general election demonstrates significant market reaction only during pre-
election period starts from the day -18 until -7 with significant negative CAAR with 
at least 10 percent level. The result is robust for the period -18 until -10 where both 
Market Model and Market Adjusted Return method shows significant negative 
CAAR. The AR does not show any significant result during the whole study window 
from the day -20 until +60. Besides, the CAAR also show no significant effect when 














Table 4.7  
AAR and CAAR of firms with government institutional holdings 20 days before the 
election and 60 days after the election during the 13th general election 
Day MM MAR AAR t-value CAAR t-value AAR t-value CAAR t-value 
t-20 0.002 0.218 0.002 0.218 0.002 0.233 0.002 0.036 
t-19 0.003 0.266 0.005 5.899 0.004 0.277 0.006*** 6.151 
t-18 -0.001 -0.121 0.004 1.261 -0.001 -0.112 0.005 1.366 
t-17 -0.001 -0.090 0.003 0.772 -0.001 -0.089 0.003 0.865 
t-16 -0.003 -0.222 0.000 0.028 -0.003 -0.233 0.001 0.098 
t-15 0.001 0.094 0.001 0.217 0.001 0.128 0.002 0.343 
t-14 -0.002 -0.214 -0.001 -0.175 -0.002 -0.196 0.000 -0.012 
t-13 0.000 -0.055 -0.001 -0.260 0.000 -0.042 0.000 -0.075 
t-12 0.003 0.235 0.002 0.297 0.003 0.230 0.003 0.439 
t-11 0.002 0.247 0.004 0.658 0.003 0.271 0.005 0.823 
t-10 -0.003 -0.267 0.001 0.203 -0.003 -0.250 0.003 0.381 
t-9 -0.008 -0.318 -0.006 -0.600 -0.007 -0.312 -0.005 -0.457 
t-8 0.000 0.014 -0.006 -0.593 0.000 0.061 -0.004 -0.422 
t-7 -0.002 -0.228 -0.008 -0.789 -0.002 -0.231 -0.006 -0.617 
t-6 -0.001 -0.058 -0.009 -0.862 -0.001 -0.044 -0.007 -0.672 
t-5 0.001 0.133 -0.008 -0.762 0.001 0.142 -0.006 -0.570 
t-4 -0.003 -0.237 -0.010 -1.004 -0.002 -0.220 -0.008 -0.795 
t-3 -0.005 -0.376 -0.015 -1.352 -0.005 -0.389 -0.013 -1.153 
t-2 0.000 -0.044 -0.015 -1.385 0.000 -0.015 -0.013* -1.163 
t-1 0.005 0.379 -0.010 -0.790 0.006 0.441 -0.007 -0.550 
t-0 0.000 0.012 -0.010 -0.767 -0.001 -0.029 -0.008 -0.609 
t+1 0.005 0.274 -0.005 -0.364 0.004 0.251 -0.003 -0.252 
t+2 -0.002 -0.174 -0.007 -0.540 -0.002 -0.157 -0.006 -0.414 
t+3 0.013 0.648 0.006 0.294 0.013 0.687 0.008 0.396 
t+4 0.005 0.258 0.011 0.549 0.005 0.258 0.013 0.647 
t+5 0.003 0.169 0.014 0.718 0.003 0.152 0.016 0.806 
t+6 -0.006 -0.258 0.008 0.402 -0.006 -0.254 0.010 0.497 
t+7 0.007 0.390 0.015 0.698 0.007 0.414 0.017 0.796 
t+8 0.005 0.235 0.020 0.909 0.005 0.252 0.023 1.022 
t+9 0.007 0.492 0.027 1.178 0.007 0.491 0.030 1.289 
t+10 0.009 0.367 0.036 1.477 0.009 0.361 0.038 1.582 
t+11 -0.005 -0.344 0.031 1.228 -0.005 -0.350 0.033 1.329 
t+12 -0.001 -0.037 0.030 1.198 0.000 -0.025 0.033 1.308 
t+13 -0.002 -0.166 0.028 1.097 -0.002 -0.138 0.031 1.223 
t+14 0.007 0.434 0.034 1.330 0.007 0.456 0.038 1.459 
t+15 0.004 0.225 0.038 1.479 0.004 0.222 0.042 1.606 
t+16 0.004 0.254 0.042 1.624 0.004 0.251 0.046* 1.750 
t+17 0.000 -0.020 0.042 1.612 0.000 0.004 0.046* 1.751 
t+18 0.004 0.286 0.046* 1.754 0.004 0.301 0.050* 1.900 
t+19 -0.003 -0.128 0.043 1.600 -0.003 -0.120 0.047* 1.754 
t+20 0.001 0.055 0.044 1.646 0.001 0.052 0.048* 1.798 
t+30 0.000 -0.024 0.043 1.256 0.004 0.321 0.044 1.445 
t+40 -0.001 -0.046 0.043 1.172 0.000 3.763 0.046 1.404 
t+50 0.008 0.252 0.050 1.187 0.000 3.566 0.048 1.448 




Table 4.8    
CAAR of firms with government institutional holdings in different window period 
during the 13th general election 
(0 to +5)  0.024** 2.406   0.023** 2.025 
(0 to +10)  0.046*** 2.938   0.046*** 2.878 
(0 to +20)  0.054** 2.643   0.055** 2.701 
(0 to +30)  0.049* 1.850   0.052* 1.969 
(0 to +40)  0.048* 1.684   0.053* 1.859 
(0 to +50)  0.050 1.675   0.055* 1.881 
(0 to +60)  0.047 1.551   0.054** 2.086 
A superscript *, ** or *** indicates significance at 10 percent,5 percent or 1 percent 
confidence level, respectively 
 
Table 4.4 and 4.5 demonstrate the same result as 12th general election in terms 
of AR. There is no significant AR for the whole study period. In contrast, there is high 
positive significant CAAR in period after election during day 
16,17,18,19,20,212,2,23,24 and 25 with 10 percent level and 5 percent level at day 24. 
In terms of different window period, the result shows that CAAR is positively 
significant at window (0 to +5), (0 to +10), (0 to +20), (0 to +30), (0 to +40), (0 to 
+50) and (0 to +60) with value of 0.023, 0.046, 0.055, 0.052, 0.053, 0.055 and 0.054 
respectively. The significance of window (0 to +10) is high with robust result where 



















Table 4.9  
AAR and CAAR of firms with government institutional holdings 20 days before the 
election and 60 days after the election during the 14th general election 
Day MM MAR AAR t-value CAAR t-value AAR t-value CAAR t-value 
t-20 0.012 0.457 0.012 0.457 0.011 0.411 0.011 0.063 
t-19 0.002 0.068 0.014* 1.947 0.001 0.041 0.012* 1.739 
t-18 -0.006 -0.306 0.008 0.675 -0.006 -0.346 0.006 0.502 
t-17 0.003 0.248 0.011 0.975 0.003 0.222 0.008 0.764 
t-16 -0.003 -0.196 0.008 0.703 -0.003 -0.255 0.005 0.431 
t-15 -0.001 -0.099 0.007 0.582 -0.002 -0.137 0.003 0.268 
t-14 -0.001 -0.095 0.005 0.459 -0.002 -0.123 0.001 0.109 
t-13 -0.003 -0.178 0.002 0.182 -0.004 -0.243 -0.003 -0.231 
t-12 0.002 0.150 0.004 0.322 0.001 0.123 -0.001 -0.113 
t-11 -0.002 -0.133 0.002 0.157 -0.002 -0.140 -0.004 -0.295 
t-10 0.001 0.119 0.003 0.273 0.001 0.112 -0.002 -0.183 
t-9 0.000 -0.019 0.003 0.250 0.000 -0.025 -0.003 -0.216 
t-8 0.004 0.259 0.007 0.553 0.004 0.230 0.001 0.066 
t-7 0.000 -0.014 0.007 0.538 -0.001 -0.066 0.000 -0.011 
t-6 0.005 0.234 0.011 0.854 0.004 0.196 0.004 0.277 
t-5 0.005 0.255 0.017 1.186 0.005 0.256 0.009 0.632 
t-4 -0.003 -0.203 0.014 0.968 -0.003 -0.241 0.006 0.400 
t-3 0.004 0.321 0.018 1.212 0.004 0.302 0.010 0.637 
t-2 0.001 0.070 0.019 1.259 0.001 0.066 0.010 0.677 
t-1 -0.002 -0.114 0.017 1.128 -0.003 -0.193 0.007 0.486 
t-0 -0.005 -0.070 0.012 0.718 -0.006 -0.079 0.002 0.093 
t+1 0.005 0.233 0.017 0.990 0.005 0.212 0.006 0.355 
t+2 0.003 0.088 0.019 1.137 0.002 0.062 0.008 0.458 
t+3 0.001 0.031 0.021 1.226 0.001 0.024 0.009 0.523 
t+4 -0.016 -0.277 0.004 0.169 -0.017 -0.285 -0.008 -0.334 
t+5 -0.003 -0.071 0.001 0.045 -0.003 -0.081 -0.011 -0.472 
t+6 0.002 0.090 0.004 0.148 0.002 0.083 -0.009 -0.377 
t+7 0.011 0.322 0.015 0.562 0.012 0.392 0.003 0.104 
t+8 0.006 0.298 0.021 0.779 0.007 0.292 0.009 0.336 
t+9 -0.004 -0.202 0.017 0.619 -0.005 -0.273 0.004 0.146 
t+10 0.011 0.334 0.028 0.948 0.011 0.366 0.015 0.495 
t+11 -0.005 -0.108 0.023 0.758 -0.004 -0.078 0.011 0.363 
t+12 -0.003 -0.092 0.020 0.663 -0.004 -0.133 0.007 0.235 
t+13 0.006 0.270 0.026 0.861 0.005 0.228 0.013 0.406 
t+14 0.007 0.340 0.033 1.065 0.006 0.323 0.019 0.599 
t+15 0.004 0.233 0.037 1.186 0.003 0.204 0.022 0.705 
t+16 0.001 0.053 0.038 1.217 0.000 -0.010 0.022 0.699 
t+17 0.003 0.170 0.041 1.303 0.002 0.124 0.024 0.760 
t+18 0.001 0.044 0.041 1.328 0.001 0.029 0.025 0.777 
t+19 -0.003 -0.161 0.039 1.236 -0.003 -0.188 0.022 0.678 
t+20 0.008 0.354 0.047 1.456 0.008 0.368 0.030 0.900 
t+30 0.002 0.137 0.066* 1.951 0.002 0.128 0.047 1.363 
t+40 -0.007 -0.497 0.056 1.501 -0.007 -0.529 0.032 0.828 
t+50 0.002 0.145 0.072* 1.882 0.001 0.098 0.041 1.034 




Table 4.10   
CAAR of firms with government institutional holdings in different window period 
during the 14th general election 
(0 to +5)  -0.016 -0.965   -0.019 -1.154 
(0 to +10)  0.011 0.450   0.008 0.302 
(0 to +20)  0.030 1.107   0.022 0.803 
(0 to +30)  0.049* 1.704   0.040 1.349 
(0 to +40)  0.040 1.190   0.025 0.719 
(0 to +50)  0.055 1.626   0.033 0.952 
(0 to +60)  0.045 1.251   0.017 0.539 
A superscript *, ** or *** indicates significance at 10 percent,5 percent or 1 percent 
confidence level, respectively 
 
14th general election also shows no significant impact on AR as 12th and 13th general 
election. The CAAR is positively significant start from day 24 until day 60 with the 
highest significant of 5 percent at day 60. Besides, both MM and MAR also show 
robust result during the day -19 where both models recorded positive CAAR 
significant at 10 percent level. In terms of a different window, the CAAR is only 
significant at the window (0 to +30) with CAAR of 0.049 at 10 percent level. 
 These finding from three election events thus support hypothesis #M where the 
is abnormal return exist and significant in companies with government holdings during 
12th, 13th, and 14th general election. On another note, it come into view that the CAAR 
for firm's with government holdings after the election date is significant for up to  60 
days is a good sign it is inconsistent with Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). In 
particular, the findings show that Malaysian market is semi-strong form due to market 
reflect on the publicly available information which is in this study, the announcement 
of general election result, particularly during 13th general election. 
 
4.3 The result of Diagnostic Testing 
Before regression analysis, this section will report the diagnostic test that has been 
carried out to ensure the model constructed in the previous chapter is valid and could 
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be interpreted in great confidence. The techniques to be discussed are normality 
distribution, multicollinearity, autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity.  
 
4.3.1 Normality of Distribution 
 
Figure 4.2 below shows that the regression residuals are not normally distributed. 
The probability of the normality test show statistics of 0.0000 which is less than 0.05 
indicates that the data is not significant. Thus, the null hypothesis that the data follows 
a normal distribution is rejected. Although the finding shows that the data is not 
normal, the violation of non-normality should not be a main concerned since in finance 
study, using secondary data usually resulted in an extreme value which provides a 






Autocorrelation is an issue that generally arises when computing regression 
analysis. Autocorrelation may affect regression whereby it will underestimate the 
actual variance in which no pairwise independent among the residuals of regression 
Figure 4.8  
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(Wang & Akabay, 1995). Durbin-Watson (DW) is an indicator to identify the 
autocorrelation model, and its value must be around 2.0 to make sure there is no 
autocorrelation exists. If the value is lower than 2.0, there is evidence of positive serial 
correlation while if the value is smaller than 1.0; there may be cause for alarm. 
Referring to Table 4.9 and 4.10 below, the value of DW is 1.78 and 1.95 which indicate 
that the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation exist is rejected. Thus, this sample shows 
that there is positive autocorrelation exists in the regression model. There is a need to 
perform autocorrelation correction by using the Newey-West Method. 
 
Table 4.11 
Durbin Watson test of sample data with the dependent variable of CAR (0,5) 
Dependent Variable: CAR (0,5) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 2008:2 2018:2 
Included Observations: 126 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-statistics Prob 
Constant 0.078 0.107 0.730 0.468 
IO 0.022 0.032 0.690 0.490 
Total Assets -0.010 0.015 -0.690 0.492 
Leverage -0.119 0.067 -1.790 0.076 
ROA 0.085 0.118 0.720 0.472 
R-squared 0.042 F-Statistics 1.320 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.010 Prob (F-Statistics) 0.265 

















Durbin Watson test of sample data with the dependent variable of CAR (0,10) 
Dependent Variable: CAR (0,10) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 2008:2 2018:2 
Included Observations: 126 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-statistics Prob 
Constant 0.239 0.103 2.320 0.022 
IO 0.021 0.031 0.680 0.496 
Total Assets -0.028 0.014 -1.930 0.056 
Leverage -0.139 0.064 -2.170 0.032 
ROA -0.114 0.114 -1.000 0.318 
R-squared 0.064 F-Statistics 2.080 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.033 Prob (F-Statistics) 0.088 









4.3.3 Heteroscedasticity Test 
Heteroscedasticity is a circumstance where the variability of the variables is not 
equal across the range of values of a second variable (dependent variable) that predict 
it (Taylor, 2013). The error term, e is an important assumption to determine whether 
it is homoscedastic or heteroscedastic in regression function. If the result shows 
homoscedasticity, it means that all variables are in the same variance. Otherwise, 
heteroscedasticity shows that all variables in different variance. Heteroscedasticity can 
be tested using the White test. Table 4.11and 4.12 below shows the White’s test result 
of the regression model in this study. According to the Table, the value of chi-squared 
statistics indicates that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is accepted. Both tables 
show probability value that is greater than 0.05 which suggest that there is no 




White test of sample data with the dependent variable of CAR (0,5)  
F-statistics 1.320 Prob. F (4,121) 0.265 
Prob. Chi-Square (2) 0.950 
 
Dependent Variable: CAR (0,5) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 2008:2 2018:2 
Included Observations: 126 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Prob 
Constant 0.078 0.107 0.730 0.468 
IO 0.022 0.032 0.690 0.490 
Total Assets -0.010 0.015 -0.690 0.492 
Leverage -0.119 0.067 -1.790 0.076 
ROA 0.085 0.118 0.720 0.472 
R-squared 0.042 F-Statistics 1.320 
Adjusted R-squared 0.010 Prob (F-Statistics) 0.265 
Sum squared resid 1.585   




Table 4.14  
White test of sample data with the dependent variable of CAR (0,10) 
F-statistics 2.080 Prob. F (4,121) 0.088 
Prob. Chi-Square (2) 0.684  
Dependent Variable: CAR (0,10) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 2008:2 2018:2 
Included Observations: 126 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-statistics Prob 
Constant 0.239 0.103 2.320 0.022 
IO 0.021 0.031 0.680 0.496 
Total Assets -0.028 0.014 -1.930 0.056 
Leverage -0.139 0.064 -2.170 0.032 
ROA -0.114 0.114 -1.000 0.318 
R-squared 0.064 F-Statistics 2.080 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.033 Prob (F-Statistics) 0.088 








For satisfying multicollinearity, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) should be less 
than 10 (Urrutia et al., 2015). VIF can detect multicollinearity problem by determining 
whether there is a strong linear relationship between two or more variables. Referring 
to Table 4.8 below, the VIF values of all variables are less than 10, which indicate that 
there is no multicollinearity problem exists in the regression model. This means that 
there will be no bias while estimating the variables' coefficient. Therefore, there is no 
need to exclude any variable from the regression model. 
 
Table 4.15  
Variance Inflation Factors of sample data 
Variance Inflation Factors 
Sample: 2008:2 2018:2 
Included Observations: 126 
Variable Coefficient Variance Uncentered VIF Mean VIF 
Constant 0.0781 NA NA 
IO 0.0225 1.04 1.05 
Total Assets -0.1039 1.08 1.05 
Leverage -0.1193 1.02 1.05 




4.4  The result from Regression Analysis 
This study uses multiple cross-sectional regression to test the hypotheses 
developed in chapter three. Also, this research estimates model to observe the effect 
of independent variables on the announcement on the election result. Table 4.13 below 
shows the finding from the cumulative abnormal return model that has been corrected 





Table 4.16  
The result of Multistage Regression of Effect of Independent Variables on Abnormal 
Returns 
Variables 
CAR (0,5) CAR (0,10) 
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
Constant 0.0781 0.88 0.2394*** 2.58 
IO 0.0225 0.91 0.0213 0.93 
SIZE -0.0104 -0.89 -0.0280*** -2.25 
LEVERAGE -0.1194* -1.83 -0.1388*** -2.21 
ROA 0.0852 0.70 -0.1140 -0.98 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0102 0.0330 
F-Statistics 1.4000 2.3400 
Number of observations 126 126 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.7751 1.9447 
A superscript *, ** or *** indicates significance at 10 percent,5 percent or 1 percent 
confidence level, respectively 
 
 
From Table 4.13 above, the adjusted R-squared is about 1 percent and 3 
percent for dependent variable CAR (0,5) and CAR (0,10) respectively. This 
explained that the model incorporated with one independent variable and three control 
variables has a weak relationship between cumulative abnormal return and the 
independent variable. In terms of the sign of the coefficient, there is a significant linear 
relationship between the general election and independent and control variables.  
 The regression result is robust even after regression is segregated in which the 
variables have been tested in different election events. This segregated result is 
attached in the Appendix E. The following section will discuss the regression results 






4.4.1 Effect of Independent Variable and Control Variables on Announcement 
of Election Result 
Results in Table 4.13 show one independent variable (institutional ownership) and 
three control variables (Size, Leverage, and ROA) were analyzed to explain the effect 
of the general election on stock returns. Findings on tested hypotheses 
H], 	Hsz,			Hs{, and	Hs~ are provided in the following section. In the section, each 
variable will be discussed separately. 
 
A. Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership (IO) in this study is a proxy of summation of share 
outstanding percentage of top 10 institutional investors. Table 4.13 shows that IO has 
a positive relationship with a cumulative abnormal return during the general election. 
However, the result is not significant. Thus, the hypothesis H]	 in which initially stated 
that there are significant relationships between abnormal stock return and institutional 
investors ownership is rejected. This result contradicts to previous findings by Bruton 
et al. (2010), Elyasiani and Jia (2010), Lin and Fu (2017) and Wong and Hooy (2017) 
in which they find a significant positive relationship between institutional ownership 
and stock return.  
This imply that the findings follows passive monitoring hypothesis which based 
on the argument that institutional investors might be the short term investors who are 
acting like common traders instead of monitoring the management and improving the 
corporate governance in the firm (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). If there is passive 
monitoring exists in a firm, it is expected that there will be weak or no relationship 
between firm performance and institutional ownership. Thus, in this study, it can be 
concluded that institutional investors in Malaysia play a passive monitoring role where 
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they invest as common traders in a firm instead of monitoring and improving the 
performance.  
 
B. Firm’s Size 
Size in this study measured by total assets of a firm. From Table 4.13 above, the 
result shows a high negative significant relationship between a firm's size and 
cumulative abnormal return during window period t=0 until t=+10. The same outcome 
is observed during the period (0,5), but it is not significant. The hypothesis #sK which 
stated that there is a significant relationship between the firm's size and abnormal stock 
return is accepted. This finding is consistent with past studies by Belghitar et al. 
(2011), Lin and Fu (2017) and Wong and Hooy (2016). This show that the bigger the 
size of the firm, the lower abnormal return observed. In this case, an increase of 1 log 
of total assets will reduce the abnormal return by -0.027959.  Possible reasons to 
explain the negative relationship between a firm's size and stock return is caused by 
deterioration in monitoring ability during the uncertain situation such as general 
election which reduced investor's confidence in firms (Aloui & Jarboui, 2017).  
 
C. Firm’s Leverage 
Leverage in this study is measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
From Table 4.13, it is expected that there is a significant relationship between 
abnormal return and firm's leverage under both variables tested. Both depended 
variables show a negative relationship with the firm's leverage. However, the 
significant level is higher for CAR (0,10) with 1 percent confidence level compared 
to CAR (0,5) with only 10 percent confidence level. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis, 
#sw (There is a significant relationship between abnormal stock return and Firm’s 
leverage) is accepted. These results support the findings from previous studies by 
 
 62 
Elyasiani (2008), Lin and Fu (2017), Liu et al. (2017) and Wong and Hooy, (2016). 
One possible reason to explain these findings caused by under-investment situation by 
investors. Based on the debt overhang theory, the higher leverage increases the 
probability of a firm obtaining a positive NPV project in the future. The payoff, 




D. Firm’s Profitability 
ROA is used as a proxy for profitability which measured by computing the ratio 
of profit over total assets. Table 4.13 shows that ROA gives a different impact on 
different CAR. ROA is positively related to CAR (0,5) with a coefficient value of 
0.085207 while during CAR (0,10) ROA reported a negative relationship with 
dependent variable with -0.113992. However, both results are insignificant which 
indicate that the hypothesis #sx (There is a negative relationship between abnormal 
stock return and Firm’s profitability) is rejected. This result opposes findings by Fuss 
and Bechtel (2008) wherein semi-strong form market, it is expected that there will be 
adverse effects on the firm's profit which should be incorporated in today stock's price. 
Past studies also highlight that investors should be vigilant during pre-general election 
periods in Malaysia as their companies experiencing high-profit volatility and 




The result from event study shows that there is significant before election result 
during the day -18 until -7 during the 12th general election. Both 13th and 14th general 
elections show significant after election effect earliest at date +9 up to day +60 with 
 
 63 
at least 10 percent confidence level. The CAAR is also significant during post-election 
window period with robust result during 13th general election where the CAAR is 
significantly positive during all windows tested while during the 14th general election, 
the CAAR is positively significant only at (0 to +30). Thus, the event study supports 
#M.From regression result, this study finds that institutional ownership does not affect 
abnormal return which rejects #]. Firm’s size, on the other hand, support #sK where 
there is a significant negative relationship between a firm's size and abnormal stock 
return. The same outcome observes in the firm's leverage where there is a significant 
negative relationship between abnormal stock return and Firm's leverage which 
support #sw. Last, but not least, the firm's profitability does not show any significant 













CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 This chapter illustrates the overall summary of the present study. Section 5.2 
provides a review of the research that includes the empirical findings of the results. 
The following section explains the implication of the study according to the computed 
results following by the limitation in this study. The final section provides a 
recommendation for future research. 
 
5.1 Summary of the Study 
 This chapter summarises the critical contribution of this study and its empirical 
findings. The motivation of this study is to provide empirical evidence on the impact 
of the general election on the stock return of companies with institutional ownership 
in Malaysia. Besides, other variables in which act as control such as size, leverage and 
profitability are applied in this research. To carry out study, 42 Malaysian public listed 
companies with government holding over the period of 2008 until 2018 is examined. 
The empirical findings of the research state that there is significant abnormal return 
recorded during 12th, 13th and 14th general election in the stock return of companies 
with government holdings. The abnormal return, however, only show effects at least 
13 days after the announcement of the election result. This outcome indicates that the 
market in Malaysia is inefficient since it is in contrast to the EMH, particularly during 
13th general election. An efficient market should have a stabilised CAAR after the 
event date because stock’s prices adjust immediately to reflect the new information, 
and in this study, is the announcement of the general election result. Other than that, 
institutional ownership is insignificantly related to the stock return. This suggests that 
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institutional investors in Malaysia play the role of passive investors where they only 
favour the return on their investment as an ordinary trader. The existence of 
institutional investors in the firm is view as the same as other retail investors where 
they did not play a role in active monitoring or improving the firm's performance. 
Thus, the result shows that the existence of institutional investors gives no impact on 
the firm's stock return. For control variables, only the firm's size and firm's leverage 
are significantly impacted the abnormal return during the period of general election. 
The negative relationship between a firm's size and stock return is caused by 
deterioration in the monitoring ability during an important event such as general 
election which reduced investor's confidence in firms. 
 
5.2 Implication of the Study 
  There are two implications deducted from this study namely practical and 
theoretical. In the case of fund manager and investors, this study can help local 
stockholders to improve their understanding by evaluating the effect of  political risk 
in the Malaysian stock market. In general, it is common knowledge to everyone that 
general election could create political uncertainty which sometimes pushes the 
investors to withdraw their equity holdings during the event. This study proves that 
this is true during very tensed general election environment witnessed during the 13th 
and 14th general election in Malaysia. The result shows that the market is inefficient 
during this time where abnormal stock return existed. This result could guide investors 
in deciding on diversifying their portfolio in the next election depending on the 
environment. In next election in Malaysia, investors could decide on investing in any 
government holding company to obtain higher return of their investment. The best 
time to buy the shares should be few days before the election day to gain the higher 
return of their capital for up to 60 days after the announcement of general election 
 
 66 
result. The same steps could be taken by fund manager. Since fund manager has higher 
fund allocation compared to retail investors, they could allocate their funds in all 
government owned companies in Malaysia few days before general election to acquire 
higher return within 60 days after the announcement of general election result. 
As for researchers, this is one of the first papers attempting to understand the 
impact of Malaysia general election considering the fight and changes of the ruling 
government on the Malaysia stock market. Besides, the uses of event study 
methodology on observing the abnormal return for 81 days window period provides a 
better understanding and coherent view of the study. Thus, this study paves the road 
for future researchers who wish to employ the event study methodology to understand 
better the effects of general elections in Malaysia .  
 
5.3 Limitation of the Study 
 This study examines the relationship between abnormal stock return and its 
explanatory variables (institutional ownership, size, leverage and profitability) during 
12th, 13th and 14th general election in Malaysia. The limitation of this study includes 
small sample size selected which is only 42 companies. Only public companies with 
government holdings are used as proxy firms with institutional ownership. Besides, 
this study just concerned about the 12th, 13th and 14th Malaysia general election. It 
focuses solely on studying if the abnormal return is present during these periods. As 
such, all result about this study is only valid in explaining the 12th, 13th and 14th 
Malaysia general election, not in any previous general elections. The result should not 






5.4 Recommendation for Future Research 
  As mentioned in the previous section, this research only studies the last three 
Malaysia general election. Therefore, the results are not a representation of general 
elections as a whole in Malaysia. It would be interesting to compare amongst the 
previous 11 general elections in Malaysia to find out if the results are consistent 
throughout the elections. It would give a rough picture of the impact of general 
elections on the stock return of companies with government holdings in general.  The 
study could be extended to investigate the same effect on other companies with 
different characteristics such as different sectors, different type or different 
institutional ownership holdings. It would be beneficial if future researches can make 
it possible to forecast the impact of general elections in Malaysia on stock returns of 
different type of companies. Furthermore, the impact of general election could be 
examined with consideration of other internal corporate governance factors such as 
board of directors characteristics. Besides, this study found that there is abnormal 
return exists during the study window, but the institutional ownership is insignificantly 
linked to the abnormal return. To understand the reason behind this, it will require a 
research dedicated entirely to understand why institutional ownership does not affect 
stock return and does it show the same outcome in the events apart from general 
elections, such as merger and acquisition and debt restructuring. The announcement 
use in this study is also considered as non-clean announcement since there is no 
filtrations of other announcement or event made by all companies selected in the 
sample study. Hence, new study with similar approach could be done with 
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1) Minister of Finance Incorporated (MOF Inc) 
1Malaysia Development Berhad 
(1MDB) 
2. Amanah Raya Berhad (ARB) 
3. Astronautic Technology (M) Sdn 
Bhd (ATSB) 
4. Bank Pembangunan Malaysia 
Berhad 
5. Bank Pertanian Malaysia 
(Agrobank) 
6. Cradle Fund Sdn Bhd 
7. Cyberview Sdn Bhd 
8. Export-Import Bank of Malaysia 
Berhad (EXIM Bank) 
9. FELCRA Berhad 
10. Halal Industry Development 
Corporation Sdn Bhd (HDC) 
11. IJN Holdings Sdn Bhd 
12. Indah Water Konsortium Sdn Bhd 
(IWK) 
13. Inno Bio Ventures Sdn Bhd (IBV) 
14. Institut Terjemahan dan Buku 
Malaysia Bhd (ITBM) 
15. Jambatan Kedua Sdn Bhd (JKSB) 
16. JKP Sdn Bhd 
17. Keretapi Tanah Melayu Berhad 
(KTMB) 
18. Khazanah Nasional Berhad 
19. Kumpulan Modal Perdana Sdn 
Bhd (KMP) 
20. Malaysia Debt Ventures Berhad 
(MDV) 
21. Malaysia Digital Economy 
Corporation Sdn Bhd (MDeC) 
22. Malaysia Kuwaiti Investment 
Corporation Sdn Bhd (MKIC) 
23. Malaysia Rail Link Sdn Bhd 
24. Malaysian Bioeconomy 
Development Corporation Sdn 
Bhd 
25. Malaysian Venture Capital 
Management Bhd (MAVCAP) 
26. Mass Rapid Transit Corporation 
Sdn Bhd (MRT) 
27. MIMOS Berhad 
28. MyCreative Ventures Sdn. Bhd. 
29. MyHSR Corporation Sdn Bhd 
30. Pembinaan BLT Sdn Bhd (PBLT) 
31. Pengurusan Aset Air Berhad 
(PAAB) 
32. Perbadanan Nasional Berhad 
(PNS) 
33. Petroliam Nasional Berhad 
(PETRONAS) 
34. Prasarana Malaysia Berhad 
35. Prokhas Sdn Bhd 
 
36. Rangkaian Hotel Seri Malaysia 
Sdn Bhd 
37. Sepang International Circuit Sdn 
Bhd (SIC) 
38. SIRIM Berhad 
39. Small Medium Enterprise 
Development Bank Malaysia 
Berhad (SME Bank) 
40. SRC International Sdn Bhd 
41. Suria Strategic Energy Resources 
Sdn Bhd 
42. Syarikat Perumahan Negara Bhd 
(SPNB) 
43. Technology Park Malaysia 
Corporation Sdn Bhd (TPM) 
44. UDA Holdings Bhd 
45. Mutiara Smart Sdn Bhd 
1Malaysia Sukuk Global Berhad 
47. AES Solutions Sdn Bhd 
48. Aset Tanah Nasional Bhd 
49. Assets Global Network Sdn Bhd 
50. DanaInfra Nasional Berhad 
51. GovCo Holdings Berhad 
52. K.L. International Airport Bhd 
(KLIAB) 
53. Malaysia Development Holding 
Sdn Bhd 
54. Malaysian Sovereign Sukuk Sdn 
Bhd 
55. Pembinaan PFI Sdn Bhd 
56. Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional 
Berhad 
57. Perwaja Terengganu Sdn Bhd 
58. Piramid Pertama Sdn Bhd 
59. Pyrotechnical Managers Holding 
Sdn Bhd 
60. SDE Solutions Sdn Bhd 
61. Syarikat Jaminan Kredit 
Perumahan Berhad 
62. Syarikat Jaminan Pembiayaan 
Perniagaan Berhad 
63. Syarikat Tanah & Harta Sdn Bhd 
64. Turus Pesawat Sdn Bhd 
65. Wakala Global Sukuk Berhad 
66. Actius Terra Global Holdings Sdn 
Bhd 
67. MKD Aman Makmur Sdn Bhd 
68. South Side Jewel Sdn Bhd 
69.Asean Potash Mining Public Co. 
Ltd 
70. Danajamin Nasional Bhd  
71.Permodalan Nasional Bhd (PNB) 
  72. Syarikat Perumahan Pegawai 
Kerajaan Sdn Bhd    
73.Aerospace Technology System 
Corporation Sdn Bhd 
 
  74. Bintulu Port Holdings Bhd 
75.Bintulu Port Sdn Bhd 
76.Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn 
Bhd 
77.Commerce Dot Com Sdn Bhd 
78.Felda Global Ventures Holdings 
Berhad 
79.FELDA Holdings Bhd 
80.HICOM Holding Berhad 
81.Johor Port Bhd 
82.Konsortium Pelabuhan Kemaman 
Sdn Bhd 
83. Kuantan Port Consortium Sdn 
Bhd 
84. Malaysia Airport (Sepang) Sdn 
Bhd 
85.Malaysia Airport Holdings Bhd 
86.Malaysia Airports Sdn Bhd 
87.Malaysian Airline System Bhd 
88.Malaysian Maritime Academy 
Sdn Bhd 
89.MARDEC Bhd 
90.Medical Online Sdn Bhd 
91.MISC Bhd 
92.National Aerospace & Defence 
Industries Berhad (NADI) 
93.National Feedlot Corporation Sdn 
Bhd 
94.Northport (Malaysia) Bhd 
95.Padiberas Nasional Bhd 
(BERNAS) 
96.PDX.Com Sdn. Bhd. 
97.Pelabuhan Tanjung Pelepas Sdn 
Bhd 
98.Penang Port Sdn Bhd 
99.Pos Malaysia Berhad 
100.Projek Lebuhraya Usahasama 
Bhd 
101.Sabah Electricity Sdn Bhd 
102.Senai Airport Terminal Services 
Sdn Bhd 
103.Telekom Malaysia Berhad 
104.Tenaga Nasional Berhad 
105.Westport Malaysia Bhd 
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2) Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH) 
106. BIMB Holdings Berhad 
107. Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad 
108. Syarikat Al-Ijarah Sdn Bhd 
109. Syarikat Takaful Malaysia 
Berhad 
110. BIMB Securities 
(Holdings) Sdn Bhd 
111. Farihan Corporation Sdn 
Bhd 
112. Bank Islam Trust Company 
(Labuan)Ltd 
113. BIMB Investment 
Management Berhad 
114. BIMB Securities Sdn Bhd 
115. BIMB Offshore Company 
Management Services Sdn 
Bhd 
116. BIMSEC Nominees 
(Asing) Sdn Bhd 
117. BIMSEC Nominess 
(Tempatan) Sdn Bhd 
118. Al Wakalah Nominess 
(Tempatan) Sdn Bhd 
119. BIMB Foreign Currency 
Clearing Agency Sdn Bhd 
120. ASEAN Retakaful 
International (L) Ltd 
121. PT Syarikat Takaful 
Indonesia 
122. PT Asuransi Takaful 
Umum 
123. PT Asuransi Takaful 
Keluarga 
124. TH Properties Sdn Bhd 
125. LTH Property Holdings Ltd 
126. LTH Porperty Holdings 2 
Ltd 
127. LTH Property Investment 
(L) Inc 
128. 10 Queen Street Place 
London Ltd 
129. Leatherhead Properties Ltd 
130. 151 BPR One Ltd 
131. 151 BPR Two Ltd 
132. Millstream Property Ltd 
133. TH Trust 
134. THP Enstek Development 
Sdn Bhd 
135. THP Pelindung Sdn Bhd 
136. THP Development 
Consultancy Sdb Bhd 
137. THP Australia Capital Sdn 
Bhd 
138. TH Connectivity Sdn Bhd 
139. TH Universal Builders Sdn 
Bhd 
140. THP Sinar Sdn Bhd 
141. THP Amanah Pty Ltd 
142. THP Bina Sdn Bhd 
143. THPS Capital Sdn Bhd 
144. THPS OCS Services Ltd 
145. THP Timur Sdn Bhd 
146. Ultimate Building Machine 
(M) Sdn Bhd 
147. THT-HCM JV Sdn Bhd 
148. THP Australia 
Development Corp 
149. THP Sydney Bay Views 
Sdn Bhd 
150. THP Mutiara Sdn Bhd 
151. THP-SBB JV Sdn Bhd 
152. Keramat Green 
Development Sdn Bhd 
153. THP Hartanah Sdn Bhd 
154. THP Perlis Sdn Bhd 
155. THP Bayan Sdn Bhd 
156. THP Citaglobal Sdn Bhd 
157. TH Properties (Jersey) Ltd 
158. THP Wentworth Point (L) 
Corporation 
159. TH Marine Sdn Bhd 
160. TH Marine Holding (L) Inc 
161. Marine 1(L) Inc 
162. TH Alam Holdings (L) Inc 
163. Alam JV DP1 (L) Inc 
164. Alam JV DP2 (L) Inc 
165. Theta Edge Berhad 
166. Lityan Application Sdn 
Bhd 
167. Impianas Sdn Bhd 
168. TH Computers Sdn Bhd 
169. TH 2.0 Sdn Bhd 
170. THT Integrated Solutions 
Sdn Bhd 
171. Sistem Komunikasi 
Gelombang Sdn Bhd 
172. Konsortium Jaya Sdn Bhd 
173. Advanced Business 
Solutions (M) Sdn Bhd 
174. Theta Mobile Sdn Bhd 
175. TH Hotel & Residence Sdn 
Bhd 
176. TH Travel & Services Sdn 
Bhd 
177. THP Bay Pavillions 
Corporation 
178. TH Hotel Alor Star Sdn 
Bhd 
179. TH Global Services Sdn 
Bhd 
180. TH Real Estate 
181. TH Plantations Sdn Bhd 
182. TH Estates Holdings (Sdn 
Bhd) 
183. TH Indo Industries Sdn 
Bhd 
184. TH Indopalms Sdn Bhd 
 
185. Deru Semangat Sdn Bhd 
186. THP Ibok Sdn Bhd 
187. Bumi Suria Ventures Sdn 
Bhd 
188. THP Bukit Berlian Sdn 
Bhd 
189. THP Kota Bahagia Sdn 
Bhd 
190. TH Ladang (Sabah & 
Sarawak) Sdn Bhd 
191. THP Agro Management 
Sdn Bhd 
192. PT Persada Kencana Prima 
193. Maju Warisanmas Sdn Bhd 
194. THP Saribas Sdn Bhd 
195. THP-YT Plantation Sdn 
Bhd 
196. Manisraya Sdn Bhd 
197. Hydroflow Sdn Bhd 
198. THP Sabaco Sdn Bhd 
199. THP Suria Mekar Sdn Bhd 
200. Cempaka Teratai Sdn Bhd 
201. Kee Wee Plantation Sdn 
Bhd 
202. TH PELITA Meludam Sdn 
Bhd 
203. TH Bonggaya Sdn Bhd 
204. TH- Usia Jatimas Sdn Bhd 
205. TH PELITA Gedong Sdn 
Bhd 
206. TH PELITA Sadong Sdn 
Bhd 
207. Ladang Jati Keningau Sdn 
Bhd 
208. Derujaya Sdn Bhd 
209. Kuni Riang Sdn Bhd 
210. Halus Riang Sdn Bhd 
211. TH PELITA Simunjan Sdn 
Bhd 











                                                 
26Source: Khazanah  website. Retrieved on 19 January 2019 from  
http://tkr.khazanah.com.my/2017/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/TKR2017.pdf 
27Source: EPF annual report 2018 
 
3) Khazanah Nasional Berhad (Khazanah)26 4) Employee Provident Fund 
(EPF)27 
213. Energy : Tenaga Nasional 
Berhad (TNB) 
214. Property : UEM Sunrise 
Berhad 
215. Financial : CIMB Group 
216. Financial : Bank Muamalat 
217. Telecommunications : Axiata 
Group Berhad (Axiata) 
218. Telecommunications: 
Telekom Malaysia Berhad ™ 
219. Infrastructure & 
Construction: UEM Group 
Berhad  
220. Infrastructure & 
Construction : PLUS 
Malaysia Berhad 
221. Infrastructure & 
Construction : UEM Edgenta 
Berhad 
222. Healthcare : IHH Healthcare 
Berhad (IHH) 
223. Aviation : Malaysia Airlines 
Berhad (MAB) 
224. Aviation: Malaysia Airports 
Holdings Berhad (MAHB) 
225. Innovation & Technology : 
Fractal Analytics 
226. Innovation & Technology 
:Cainiao Network 
227. Innovation & Technology : 
General Fusion 
228. Innovation & Technology : 
Aemulus Holdings Berhad 
229. Innovation & Technology : 
Alibaba Group’s 
230. Healthcare & Wellness : 
Acibadem Healthcare Group 
231. Healthcare & Wellness : 
ReGen Rehabilitation 
International Sdn Bhd 
232. Creative & Media : Astro 
Malaysia Holdings Berhad 
(AMH) 
233. Financial Services : ACR 
Capital Holdings Pte Ltd 
234. Financial Services : 
Acibadem Sigorta  
235. Financial Services : Sun Life 
malaysia 
236. Property: 8990 Holdings 
237. Telecommunications : edotco 
Group Berhad (edotco) 
238. Telecommunications : TIME 
dotcom Berhad (TIME) 
239. Power : Shuaibah 
Independent Water and 
Power Project 
240. Life Science :  Xeraya 
Capital  
241. Sustainable Development : 
Cenviro Sdn Bhd 
242. Sustainable Development : 
RedT Energy 
243. Sustainable Development : 
Cenergi SEA 
244. Agrifood : Blue Archipelago 
Berhad (BAB) 
245. Agrifood : Biotropics 
Malaysia Berhad 
246. Agrifood : Malaysian 
Agrifood Corporation 
Berhad (MAFC)  
247. Agrifood : The Holstein 
Milk Company Sdn Bhd 
(Holstein) 
248. Property : Iskandar 
Investment Berhad (IIB) 
249. Property : Medini Iskandar 
Malaysia Sdn Bhd 
(MIMSB) 
250. Property : Pulau Indah 
Ventures Sdn Bhd  
251. Property : MS Pte Ltd 
252. Creative & Media : 
Granatum Ventures Sdn Bhd 
253. Creative & Media : 
Pinewood Iskandar Malaysia 
Studios 
254. Education : LeapEd Services 
Sdn Bhd (LeapEd) 
255. Leisure & Tourism : 
Themed Attractions Resorts 
& Hotels Sdn Bhd 
(TAR&H)'s 
 
256. Malaysia Building Society Bhd 
257. RHB Bank Bhd 
258. Malaysian Resources 
Corporation Bhd 
259. Telekom Malaysia Bhd 
260. Axiata Group 
Bhd                                       
261. DiGi.Com Bhd  
262. Genting Plantations Bhd                         
263. MBM Resources Bhd                         
264. Public Bank Bhd                              
265. CIMB Group Holdings Bhd                    
266. IJM Corporation Bhd                                  
267. United Plantations Bhd                  
268. IJM Plantations Bhd                          
269. Sunway Reit Bhd                                       
270. Axis Real Estate Investment Bhd                
271. Bermaz Auto Bhd                                     
272. Media Prima Bhd                          
273. BIMB Holdings Bhd                        
274. KPJ Healthcare Bhd             
275. Hong Leong Bank Bhd 
276. Malayan Banking Bhd                   
277. Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd          
278. Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Bhd          
279. Cahya Mata Sarawak Bhd 
280. Sime Darby Plantation Bhd 
281. Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad 
282. Alliance Bank Malaysia Bhd 
283. Tenaga Nasional Bhd 
284. Gamuda Bhd 









5) Armed Forces Fund Board 
286. Boustead Holdings Berhad 
(BHB)  
287. Power Cables Malaysia 
Sdn. Bhd. (PCMSB)  
288. Irat Properties Sdn. Bhd. 
(IPSB)  
289. Perbadanan Perwira Harta 
Malaysia (PPHM)  
290. Perbadanan Hal Ehwal 
Bekas Angkatan Tentera 
(PERHEBAT)  
291. Perwira Niaga Malaysia 
(PERNAMA)  
292. Affin Holdings Berhad 
(AHB)  
293. Buroi Mining Sdn Bhd 
294. Boustead Heavy Industries 
Corporation Berhad  
295. Boustead Properties Berhad   
296. Boustead Plantations 
Berhad  
297. Pharmaniaga Berhad   
298. UAC Berhad  
299. BHIC Defence 
Technologies Sdn Bhd   
300. BHIC Defence 
Techservices Sdn Bhd   
301. BHIC Electronics and 
Technologies Sdn Bhd   
302. BHIC Navaltech Sdn Bhd   
303. BHIC Marine Carrier Sdn 
Bhd  
BHIC Allied Defence 
Technology Sdn Bhd   
304. Bounty Crop Sdn Bhd  
Boustead Advisory and 
Consultancy  
305. Services Sdn Bhd  
Boustead Balau Sdn Bhd  
Boustead Building 
Materials Sdn Bhd   
306. Boustead Construction Sdn 
Bhd   
307. Boustead Credit Sdn Bhd   
308. Boustead Curve Sdn Bhd   
309. Boustead DCP Sdn Bhd   
310. Cargo Freight Shipping Sdn 
Bhd   
311. Damansara Entertainment 
Centre Sdn Bhd  
312. Dominion Defence & 
Industries Sdn Bhd   
313. Johan Ceramics Berhad  
314. Midas Mayang Sdn Bhd  
315. Mutiara Rini Sdn Bhd  
316. Nam Seng Bee Hoon Sdn 
Bhd  
317. Mecuro Properties Sdn Bhd  
318. Naval and Defence 
Communication System 
Sdn Bhd  
319. The University of 
Nottingham in Malaysia 
Sdn Bhd  
320. Idaman Pharma 
Manufacturing Sdn Bhd   
321. Pharmaniaga Biomedical 
Sdn Bhd 
322. Pharmaniaga LifeScience 
Sdn Bhd   
323. Pharmaniaga Logistic Sdn 
Bhd   
324. Pharmaniaga 
Manufacturing Bhd   
325. Pharmaniaga Marketing 
Sdn Bhd   
326. Pharmaniaga Research 
Centre Sdn Bhd   
327. Pharmaniaga Pristine Sdn 
Bhd   
328. Pharmaniaga International 
Corporation Sdn Bhd  
329. UAC Steel Systems Sdn 
Bhd   
330. Applied Agricultural 
Resources Sdn Bhd   
331. Boustead Wah Seong Sdn 
Bhd  
332. BP Malaysia Holdings Sdn 
Bhd 
333. Cadbury Confectionery 
Malaysia Sdn Bhd   
334. Drew Ameroid (Malaysia) 
Sdn Bhd  Ericsson 
(Malaysia) Sdn Bhd 
335. ABB IT & Services Sdn 
Bhd  
ABB Nominee (Asing) 
Sdn Bhd   
336. ABB Nominee (Tempatan) 
Sdn Bhd   
337. ABB Trustee Berhad  
Affin Bank Berhad   
338. Affin Factors Sdn Bhd  
Affin Capital Services 
Berhad  
Affin Futures Sdn Bhd  
Affin Hwang Investment 
Bank Berhad   
339. Affin Hwang Nominees 
(Tempatan)  
340. Sdn Bhd  
Affin Hwang Nominees 
(Asing) Sdn Bhd   
341. Affin Hwang Asset 
Management Berhad   
342. Affin Islamic Bank Berhad  
Affin Moneybrokers Sdn 
Bhd  
Affin Recoveries Berhad  
Affin-ACF Holdings Sdn 
Bhd  
Affin-ACF Nominees 
(Tempatan) Sdn Bhd   
343. BSNCB Nominees 
(Tempatan) Sdn Bhd   
344.  BSNC Nominees 
(Tempatan) Sdn Bhd   
345. Perstim Industries Sdn Bhd   
346. PAB Properties Sdn Bhd 
347. PAB Property 
Development Sdn Bhd   
348. AXA Affin General 
Insurance Bhd   
349. AXA Affin Life 
Insurance Berhad  
350. Affin-I Nadayu Sdn Bhd  
KL South Development 
Sdn Bhd   
351. Boustead Information 
Technology Sdn Bhd 
352. Boustead Langkawi 
Shipyard Sdn Bhd   
353. Boustead Management 
Services Sdn Bhd  
354. Boustead Naval Shipyard 
Sdn Bhd   
355. Boustead Penang Shipyard 
Sdn Bhd   
356. Boustead Petroleum 
Marketing Sdn Bhd   
357. Boustead Realty Sdn Bhd  
358. Boustead Rimba Nilai Sdn 
Bhd   
359. Boustead Sedili Sdn Bhd  
360. Boustead Segaria Sdn Bhd  
361. Boustead Shipping 
Agencies Sdn Bhd   
362. Boustead Sissons Paints 
Sdn Bhd   
363. Boustead Solandra Sdn 
Bhd   
364. Boustead Sungai Manar 
Sdn Bhd   
365. Boustead Telok Sengat 
Sdn Bhd   
366. Boustead Travel Services 
Sdn Bhd   
367. Boustead Trunkline Sdn 
Bhd   
368. Boustead Weld Court Sdn 
Bhd   
369. Boustead Weld Quay Sdn 
Bhd   
370. Cargo Freight Shipping 
Sdn Bhd   
371. Damansara Entertainment 
Centre Sdn Bhd  
372. Dominion Defence & 

























                                                 
28 Source: Retirement fund website. Retrieved on 19 January 2019 from 
http://www.kwap.gov.my/EN/UsefulInformation/Publication/Annual%20Reports/KWAP%20Annual
%20Report%202017.pdf 
29 Source: PNB Website. Retrieved on 19 January 2019 from 
http://www.pnb.com.my/pdf/AR/PNBAR2017.pdf 
6) Retirement Fund (Incorporated)28 7) Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB)29 
373. KWAP Managed Investment Trust  
374. KWAP Managed Investment Trust 2  
375. KWAP Managed Investment Trust 3  
376. KWAP Managed Investment Trust 4  
377. Prima Ekuiti (UK) Limited  
378. Prima Harta (Jersey) Unit Trust  
379. Prima Harta 2 (Jersey) Unit Trust  
380. Prima Harta 3 (Lux) Sàrl  
381. Capsquare Tower Sdn Bhd  
382. KWEST Sdn Bhd  
383. Harta Integra Berkat Sdn Bhd  
384. ValueCap Sdn Bhd Malaysia  
385. Malakoff Corporation Bhd  
386. Prestariang Bhd  
387. Persada Mentari Sdn Bhd  
388. Vortex Solar Investment Sàrl  
389. Tap Crunch International Sdn Bhd  
390. Tap Crunch Sdn Bhd 
391. 123RF Technology Sdn Bhd  
392. Eco World Development Group Berhad  
393. Capitaland Malaysia Mall Trust  
394. UEM Group Berhad  
395. DRB-HICOM Berhad  
396. TIME dotcom Berhad  
397. Yinson Holdings Berhad  
398. Lotte Chemical Titan Holdings Berhad  
399. Eastern & Oriental Berhad  
400. Globetronics Technology Berhad  
401. Inari Amertron Berhad  
402. SP Setia Berhad  
403. Felda Global Ventures Holdings Berhad  
404. Telekom Malaysia Berhad 
405. Malayan Banking Berhad 
406. Sime Darby Berhad 
407. Sime Darby Plantation Berhad 
408. Sime Darby Property Berhad 
409. SP Setia Berhad 
410. UMW Holdings Berhad 
411. Velesto Energy Berhad 
412. Chemical Company of Malaysia Berhad 
413. CCM Duopharma Biotech Berhad 
414. MNRB Holdings Berhad 
415. Telekom Malaysia Berhad 
416. MMC Corporation Berhad 
417. BIMB Holdings Berhad 
418. Tenaga Nasional Berhad 
419. Axiata Group Berhad 
420. IJM Corporation Berhad 
421. Gamuda Berhad 
422. Sapura Energy Berhad 
423. Digi.com Berhad 
424. Maxis Berhad 
425. Petronas Gas Berhad 
426. CIMB Groups Holdings Berhad 
427. RHB Bank Berhad 
428. Fraser & Neave Holdings Berhad 
429. Petronas dagangan Berhad 
430. IOI corporation Berhad 
431. Malaysian Industrial Development Finance 
Berhad 
432. Projek Lintasan Kota Holdings Sdn Bhd 
433. Perusahaan otomobil kedua sdn Bhd 
434. Boh Plantation Sdn Bhd 
435. KAF Securities Sdn Bhd 
436. Carrier International Sdn Bhd 
437. Akzo Nobel Paints (M) Sdn Bhd 
438. Unilever (Malaysia) Holdings  Sdn Bhd 
439. Carsem (M) Sdn Bhd 




APPENDIX B: List of Final Companies for Sample 
 
1) Malayan Banking Bhd 
2) Malaysia Airport Holdings Bhd   
3) Sime Darby Bhd 
 4) Pos Malaysia Bhd 
5) UMW Holdings Bhd 
 6) MISC Bhd 
7) CCM Duopharma Biotech Bhd 
 8) Bintulu Port Holdings Bhd 
9) MNRB Holdings Bhd  
10) Telekom Malaysia Bhd  
11) MMC Corporation Bhd  
12) BIMB Holdings Bhd  
13) Tenaga Nasional Bhd  
14) IJM Corporation Bhd  
15) Gamuda Bhd  
16) Digi.com Bhd  
17) Petronas Gas Bhd  
18) RHB Bank Bhd  
19) Fraser Neave Holdings Bhd  
20) Petronas dagangan Bhd  
21) IOI corporation Bhd  
22) DRB-HICOM Bhd   
23) TIME dotcom Bhd   
24) Eastern & Oriental Bhd   
25) Affin Bank Bhd   
26) Boustead Holdings Bhd   
27) TH Plantations Bhd  
28) Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Bhd  
29) Aeon Co M Bhd  
30) PPB Group Bhd   
31) Malaysia Building Society Bhd  
32) Malaysian Resources Corporation  
33) Genting Plantations Bhd                          
34) MBM Resources Bhd                          
35) Public Bank Bhd                               
36) United Plantations Bhd                   
37) IJM Plantations Bhd                           
38) Media Prima Bhd                           
39) KPJ Healthcare Bhd              
40) Hong Leong Bank Bhd  
41) Cahya Mata Sarawak Bhd  











APPENDIX C :MM and MAR Result 
 
 
 Table C-1: AAR and CAAR of firms with government institutional holdings 20 days 
before election and 60 days after election during 12th general election 
 
Day MM MAR AAR t-value CAAR t-value AAR t-value CAAR t-value 
-20 -0.011 -0.775 -0.011 0.000 -0.011 -0.126 -0.011 -0.126 
-19 0.001 0.028 -0.010 -1.253 0.001 0.005 -0.010* -1.752 
-18 -0.007 -0.205 -0.017** -2.358 -0.007 -0.030 -0.016** -2.326 
-17 -0.002 -0.139 -0.019** -2.627 -0.002 -0.021 -0.019** -2.604 
-16 0.000 0.023 -0.019** -2.225 0.001 0.007 -0.018** -2.116 
-15 0.002 0.163 -0.017* -1.684 0.003 0.026 -0.015 -1.528 
-14 -0.005 -0.261 -0.021** -2.158 -0.005 -0.038 -0.020* -1.984 
-13 -0.001 -0.069 -0.023** -2.283 -0.001 -0.007 -0.021** -2.058 
-12 -0.001 -0.020 -0.023** -2.298 0.000 0.000 -0.021* -2.008 
-11 0.001 0.056 -0.022** -2.097 0.002 0.012 -0.019* -1.749 
-10 -0.009 -0.368 -0.031** -2.528 -0.009 -0.054 -0.028** -2.199 
-9 0.004 0.143 -0.027* -1.942 0.004 0.023 -0.024 -1.672 
-8 0.000 -0.016 -0.027* -1.961 0.000 -0.001 -0.024 -1.678 
-7 0.000 0.027 -0.027* -1.900 0.001 0.007 -0.023 -1.595 
-6 0.011 0.350 -0.016 -0.837 0.011 0.056 -0.012 -0.605 
-5 0.005 0.301 -0.010 -0.526 0.006 0.052 -0.006 -0.274 
-4 -0.002 -0.082 -0.012 -0.603 -0.001 -0.008 -0.007 -0.323 
-3 0.003 0.124 -0.009 -0.446 0.004 0.023 -0.003 -0.131 
-2 -0.006 -0.405 -0.015 -0.727 -0.006 -0.062 -0.009 -0.420 
-1 -0.001 -0.050 -0.016 -0.790 -0.001 -0.006 -0.010 -0.467 
0 0.006 0.129 -0.010 -0.455 0.009 0.017 -0.001 -0.041 
1 -0.001 -0.052 -0.011 -0.523 -0.002 -0.009 -0.003 -0.123 
2 -0.001 -0.047 -0.013 -0.575 -0.001 -0.009 -0.004 -0.184 
3 0.001 0.037 -0.012 -0.539 0.002 0.011 -0.003 -0.114 
4 -0.005 -0.186 -0.017 -0.770 -0.005 -0.027 -0.008 -0.325 
5 -0.005 -0.232 -0.022 -0.975 -0.004 -0.026 -0.012 -0.501 
6 0.004 0.111 -0.018 -0.784 0.004 0.018 -0.008 -0.324 
7 -0.005 -0.265 -0.023 -0.988 -0.005 -0.041 -0.013 -0.519 
8 0.003 0.197 -0.020 -0.833 0.004 0.032 -0.009 -0.371 
9 0.006 0.374 -0.014 -0.559 0.006 0.058 -0.003 -0.120 
10 0.016 0.728 0.002 0.065 0.016 0.104 0.013 0.416 
11 -0.007 -0.177 -0.005 -0.153 -0.007 -0.029 0.006 0.185 
12 -0.010 -0.328 -0.014 -0.456 -0.010 -0.049 -0.004 -0.126 
13 0.001 0.056 -0.013 -0.409 0.002 0.009 -0.003 -0.079 
14 -0.012 -0.392 -0.025 -0.748 -0.012 -0.060 -0.015 -0.423 
15 0.003 0.130 -0.022 -0.651 0.004 0.023 -0.011 -0.319 
16 -0.011 -0.625 -0.033 -0.926 -0.010 -0.096 -0.022 -0.593 
17 0.000 0.034 -0.032 -0.913 0.001 0.009 -0.021 -0.569 
18 0.010 0.512 -0.023 -0.610 0.010 0.090 -0.010 -0.275 
19 0.002 0.137 -0.021 -0.556 0.002 0.024 -0.008 -0.215 
20 0.004 0.289 -0.017 -0.458 0.004 0.045 -0.004 -0.115 
21 -0.001 -0.081 -0.018 -0.489 -0.001 -0.011 -0.005 -0.142 
22 0.011 0.491 -0.007 -0.180 0.011 0.074 0.006 0.149 
23 -0.016 -0.776 -0.023 -0.554 -0.016 -0.144 -0.011 -0.244 
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24 -0.005 -0.207 -0.028 -0.660 -0.004 -0.030 -0.015 -0.342 
25 0.023 0.609 -0.005 -0.110 0.023 0.097 0.008 0.168 
26 -0.004 -0.215 -0.009 -0.196 -0.004 -0.033 0.004 0.083 
27 -0.005 -0.343 -0.014 -0.289 -0.005 -0.054 0.000 -0.008 
28 0.005 0.296 -0.009 -0.175 0.006 0.046 0.005 0.106 
29 0.000 0.011 -0.008 -0.171 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.110 
30 -0.004 -0.177 -0.012 -0.250 -0.004 -0.026 0.002 0.032 
31 0.007 0.461 -0.005 -0.099 0.008 0.073 0.009 0.181 
32 -0.009 -0.496 -0.014 -0.271 -0.009 -0.083 0.001 0.010 
33 -0.006 -0.439 -0.020 -0.392 -0.006 -0.068 -0.006 -0.108 
34 0.006 0.395 -0.014 -0.269 0.006 0.063 0.001 0.017 
35 -0.015 -1.052 -0.029 -0.547 -0.015 -0.161 -0.014 -0.265 
36 0.010 0.434 -0.019 -0.349 0.011 0.070 -0.004 -0.068 
37 -0.002 -0.071 -0.021 -0.381 -0.001 -0.009 -0.005 -0.094 
38 0.000 0.022 -0.020 -0.376 0.001 0.006 -0.005 -0.085 
39 0.010 0.546 -0.011 -0.193 0.010 0.091 0.005 0.097 
40 0.005 0.240 -0.005 -0.099 0.005 0.038 0.011 0.191 
41 -0.003 -0.151 -0.008 -0.145 -0.002 -0.022 0.008 0.148 
42 -0.002 -0.088 -0.010 -0.175 -0.002 -0.014 0.007 0.120 
43 0.004 0.289 -0.005 -0.094 0.005 0.046 0.012 0.205 
44 -0.006 -0.517 -0.011 -0.197 -0.006 -0.080 0.006 0.104 
45 -0.010 -0.701 -0.021 -0.374 -0.010 -0.101 -0.004 -0.072 
46 0.010 0.508 -0.011 -0.191 0.011 0.082 0.006 0.108 
47 0.004 0.265 -0.007 -0.122 0.004 0.042 0.011 0.179 
48 -0.017 -0.713 -0.024 -0.397 -0.017 -0.111 -0.006 -0.101 
49 -0.004 -0.281 -0.027 -0.457 -0.004 -0.041 -0.010 -0.158 
50 -0.004 -0.290 -0.031 -0.523 -0.004 -0.042 -0.013 -0.220 
51 0.012 0.733 -0.020 -0.321 0.012 0.114 -0.001 -0.020 
52 0.001 0.055 -0.019 -0.312 0.001 0.013 0.000 -0.005 
53 0.003 0.190 -0.016 -0.256 0.004 0.031 0.003 0.054 
54 -0.005 -0.254 -0.021 -0.344 -0.005 -0.037 -0.002 -0.029 
55 0.000 -0.004 -0.021 -0.344 0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.025 
56 -0.005 -0.108 -0.026 -0.417 -0.004 -0.016 -0.006 -0.094 
57 0.004 0.167 -0.022 -0.353 0.004 0.030 -0.002 -0.024 
58 -0.004 -0.219 -0.026 -0.416 -0.004 -0.031 -0.005 -0.083 
59 -0.021 -0.613 -0.047 -0.714 -0.021 -0.098 -0.026 -0.393 
60 -0.002 -0.061 -0.048 -0.737 -0.001 -0.006 -0.027 -0.393 
A superscript *, ** or *** indicates significance at 10 percent,5 percent or 1 percent 




Table C-2 : AAR and CAAR of firms with government institutional holdings 20 
days before election and 60 days after election during 13th general election 
Day MM MAR AAR t-value CAAR t-value AAR t-value CAAR t-value 
-20 0.002 0.218 0.002 0.218 0.002 0.036 0.002 0.036 
-19 0.003 0.266 0.005 5.899 0.004 0.042 0.006*** 6.151 
-18 -0.001 -0.121 0.004 1.261 -0.001 -0.017 0.005 1.366 
-17 -0.001 -0.090 0.003 0.772 -0.001 -0.014 0.003 0.865 
-16 -0.003 -0.222 0.000 0.028 -0.003 -0.036 0.001 0.098 
-15 0.001 0.094 0.001 0.217 0.001 0.020 0.002 0.343 
-14 -0.002 -0.214 -0.001 -0.175 -0.002 -0.030 0.000 -0.012 
-13 0.000 -0.055 -0.001 -0.260 0.000 -0.006 0.000 -0.075 
-12 0.003 0.235 0.002 0.297 0.003 0.035 0.003 0.439 
-11 0.002 0.247 0.004 0.658 0.003 0.041 0.005 0.823 
-10 -0.003 -0.267 0.001 0.203 -0.003 -0.038 0.003 0.381 
-9 -0.008 -0.318 -0.006 -0.600 -0.007 -0.048 -0.005 -0.457 
-8 0.000 0.014 -0.006 -0.593 0.000 0.009 -0.004 -0.422 
-7 -0.002 -0.228 -0.008 -0.789 -0.002 -0.035 -0.006 -0.617 
-6 -0.001 -0.058 -0.009 -0.862 -0.001 -0.007 -0.007 -0.672 
-5 0.001 0.133 -0.008 -0.762 0.001 0.022 -0.006 -0.570 
-4 -0.003 -0.237 -0.010 -1.004 -0.002 -0.034 -0.008 -0.795 
-3 -0.005 -0.376 -0.015 -1.352 -0.005 -0.059 -0.013 -1.153 
-2 0.000 -0.044 -0.015 -1.385 0.000 -0.002 -0.013 -1.163 
-1 0.005 0.379 -0.010 -0.790 0.006 0.067 -0.007 -0.550 
0 0.000 0.012 -0.010 -0.767 -0.001 -0.004 -0.008 -0.609 
1 0.005 0.274 -0.005 -0.364 0.004 0.038 -0.003 -0.252 
2 -0.002 -0.174 -0.007 -0.540 -0.002 -0.024 -0.006 -0.414 
3 0.013 0.648 0.006 0.294 0.013 0.105 0.008 0.396 
4 0.005 0.258 0.011 0.549 0.005 0.039 0.013 0.647 
5 0.003 0.169 0.014 0.718 0.003 0.023 0.016 0.806 
6 -0.006 -0.258 0.008 0.402 -0.006 -0.039 0.010 0.497 
7 0.007 0.390 0.015 0.698 0.007 0.063 0.017 0.796 
8 0.005 0.235 0.020 0.909 0.005 0.038 0.023 1.022 
9 0.007 0.492 0.027 1.178 0.007 0.075 0.030 1.289 
10 0.009 0.367 0.036 1.477 0.009 0.055 0.038 1.582 
11 -0.005 -0.344 0.031 1.228 -0.005 -0.053 0.033 1.329 
12 -0.001 -0.037 0.030 1.198 0.000 -0.004 0.033 1.308 
13 -0.002 -0.166 0.028 1.097 -0.002 -0.021 0.031 1.223 
14 0.007 0.434 0.034 1.330 0.007 0.069 0.038 1.459 
15 0.004 0.225 0.038 1.479 0.004 0.034 0.042 1.606 
16 0.004 0.254 0.042 1.624 0.004 0.038 0.046* 1.750 
17 0.000 -0.020 0.042 1.612 0.000 0.001 0.046* 1.751 
18 0.004 0.286 0.046* 1.754 0.004 0.046 0.050* 1.900 
19 -0.003 -0.128 0.043 1.600 -0.003 -0.018 0.047* 1.754 
20 0.001 0.055 0.044 1.646 0.001 0.008 0.048* 1.798 
21 0.000 -0.024 0.043 1.627 0.000 -0.002 0.048* 1.786 
22 -0.001 -0.046 0.043 1.593 -0.001 -0.005 0.047* 1.763 
23 0.008 0.252 0.050* 1.826 0.008 0.038 0.055* 1.992 
24 0.006 0.268 0.056* 2.008 0.006 0.040 0.061** 2.170 
25 -0.007 -0.433 0.049* 1.694 -0.007 -0.059 0.054* 1.866 
26 -0.005 -0.340 0.044 1.493 -0.005 -0.050 0.049 1.671 
27 -0.001 -0.044 0.043 1.462 0.000 -0.001 0.049 1.668 
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28 -0.004 -0.212 0.040 1.321 -0.004 -0.034 0.045 1.514 
29 -0.005 -0.352 0.035 1.131 -0.005 -0.055 0.040 1.318 
30 0.004 0.315 0.039 1.256 0.004 0.049 0.044 1.445 
31 0.004 0.224 0.042 1.365 0.004 0.036 0.048 1.559 
32 0.000 0.018 0.042 1.374 0.001 0.006 0.049 1.579 
33 -0.006 -0.275 0.036 1.140 -0.006 -0.041 0.043 1.350 
34 -0.005 -0.303 0.031 0.962 -0.005 -0.041 0.038 1.187 
35 -0.001 -0.035 0.030 0.945 0.000 -0.002 0.038 1.181 
36 0.004 0.248 0.035 1.071 0.004 0.036 0.042 1.304 
37 0.004 0.244 0.038 1.180 0.004 0.035 0.046 1.411 
38 0.001 0.039 0.039 1.208 0.001 0.004 0.046 1.430 
39 -0.001 -0.066 0.038 1.170 -0.001 -0.009 0.045 1.395 
40 0.000 0.006 0.038 1.172 0.000 0.004 0.046 1.404 
41 0.002 0.134 0.040 1.234 0.002 0.022 0.048 1.473 
42 0.002 0.192 0.042 1.282 0.002 0.031 0.049 1.523 
43 0.003 0.271 0.045 1.373 0.003 0.043 0.053 1.619 
44 -0.001 -0.071 0.044 1.347 0.000 -0.006 0.052 1.603 
45 -0.003 -0.253 0.041 1.257 -0.003 -0.038 0.050 1.513 
46 0.001 0.058 0.042 1.279 0.001 0.010 0.050 1.539 
47 -0.005 -0.395 0.037 1.099 -0.005 -0.061 0.045 1.350 
48 0.001 0.057 0.037 1.116 0.001 0.010 0.046 1.368 
49 0.002 0.180 0.039 1.182 0.002 0.030 0.048 1.438 
50 0.000 0.015 0.040 1.187 0.000 0.004 0.048 1.448 
51 0.000 -0.031 0.039 1.178 0.000 -0.003 0.048 1.442 
52 0.005 0.407 0.044 1.313 0.005 0.063 0.053 1.578 
53 -0.003 -0.460 0.041 1.211 -0.003 -0.072 0.050 1.474 
54 -0.002 -0.214 0.039 1.163 -0.001 -0.030 0.049 1.431 
55 0.001 0.084 0.040 1.187 0.001 0.013 0.049 1.455 
56 -0.001 -0.104 0.039 1.145 -0.001 -0.015 0.048 1.414 
57 0.000 -0.048 0.039 1.133 0.000 -0.004 0.048 1.408 
58 0.000 0.047 0.039 1.144 0.001 0.010 0.048 1.424 
59 -0.002 -0.169 0.036 1.068 -0.002 -0.023 0.046 1.356 
60 0.001 0.137 0.037 1.096 0.001 0.026 0.047 1.356 
A superscript *, ** or *** indicates significance at 10 percent,5 percent or 1 percent 






Table C-3 :AAR and CAAR of firms with government institutional holdings 20 days 
before election and 60 days after election during 14th general election 
Day MM MAR AAR t-value CAAR t-value AAR t-value CAAR t-value 
-20 0.012 0.457 0.012 0.457 0.011 0.063 0.011 0.063 
-19 0.002 0.068 0.014* 1.947 0.001 0.006 0.012* 1.739 
-18 -0.006 -0.306 0.008 0.675 -0.006 -0.053 0.006 0.502 
-17 0.003 0.248 0.011 0.975 0.003 0.034 0.008 0.764 
-16 -0.003 -0.196 0.008 0.703 -0.003 -0.039 0.005 0.431 
-15 -0.001 -0.099 0.007 0.582 -0.002 -0.021 0.003 0.268 
-14 -0.001 -0.095 0.005 0.459 -0.002 -0.019 0.001 0.109 
-13 -0.003 -0.178 0.002 0.182 -0.004 -0.037 -0.003 -0.231 
-12 0.002 0.150 0.004 0.322 0.001 0.019 -0.001 -0.113 
-11 -0.002 -0.133 0.002 0.157 -0.002 -0.021 -0.004 -0.295 
-10 0.001 0.119 0.003 0.273 0.001 0.017 -0.002 -0.183 
-9 0.000 -0.019 0.003 0.250 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 -0.216 
-8 0.004 0.259 0.007 0.553 0.004 0.035 0.001 0.066 
-7 0.000 -0.014 0.007 0.538 -0.001 -0.010 0.000 -0.011 
-6 0.005 0.234 0.011 0.854 0.004 0.030 0.004 0.277 
-5 0.005 0.255 0.017 1.186 0.005 0.039 0.009 0.632 
-4 -0.003 -0.203 0.014 0.968 -0.003 -0.037 0.006 0.400 
-3 0.004 0.321 0.018 1.212 0.004 0.046 0.010 0.637 
-2 0.001 0.070 0.019 1.259 0.001 0.010 0.010 0.677 
-1 -0.002 -0.114 0.017 1.128 -0.003 -0.029 0.007 0.486 
0 -0.005 -0.070 0.012 0.718 -0.006 -0.012 0.002 0.093 
1 0.005 0.233 0.017 0.990 0.005 0.032 0.006 0.355 
2 0.003 0.088 0.019 1.137 0.002 0.009 0.008 0.458 
3 0.001 0.031 0.021 1.226 0.001 0.004 0.009 0.523 
4 -0.016 -0.277 0.004 0.169 -0.017 -0.043 -0.008 -0.334 
5 -0.003 -0.071 0.001 0.045 -0.003 -0.012 -0.011 -0.472 
6 0.002 0.090 0.004 0.148 0.002 0.013 -0.009 -0.377 
7 0.011 0.322 0.015 0.562 0.012 0.060 0.003 0.104 
8 0.006 0.298 0.021 0.779 0.007 0.045 0.009 0.336 
9 -0.004 -0.202 0.017 0.619 -0.005 -0.042 0.004 0.146 
10 0.011 0.334 0.028 0.948 0.011 0.056 0.015 0.495 
11 -0.005 -0.108 0.023 0.758 -0.004 -0.012 0.011 0.363 
12 -0.003 -0.092 0.020 0.663 -0.004 -0.020 0.007 0.235 
13 0.006 0.270 0.026 0.861 0.005 0.035 0.013 0.406 
14 0.007 0.340 0.033 1.065 0.006 0.049 0.019 0.599 
15 0.004 0.233 0.037 1.186 0.003 0.031 0.022 0.705 
16 0.001 0.053 0.038 1.217 0.000 -0.001 0.022 0.699 
17 0.003 0.170 0.041 1.303 0.002 0.019 0.024 0.760 
18 0.001 0.044 0.041 1.328 0.001 0.004 0.025 0.777 
19 -0.003 -0.161 0.039 1.236 -0.003 -0.029 0.022 0.678 
20 0.008 0.354 0.047 1.456 0.008 0.056 0.030 0.900 
21 0.004 0.247 0.051 1.579 0.004 0.034 0.033 1.008 
22 0.000 -0.016 0.051 1.570 -0.001 -0.006 0.033 0.987 
23 0.001 0.042 0.052 1.602 0.001 0.007 0.034 1.021 
24 0.004 0.168 0.055* 1.707 0.004 0.029 0.038 1.134 
25 0.007 0.427 0.062* 1.893 0.007 0.065 0.044 1.315 
26 -0.005 -0.213 0.057* 1.696 -0.005 -0.031 0.039 1.139 
27 0.004 0.310 0.061* 1.822 0.004 0.042 0.043 1.249 
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28 0.004 0.344 0.066* 1.946 0.004 0.048 0.047 1.373 
29 -0.002 -0.115 0.064* 1.890 -0.002 -0.022 0.045 1.308 
30 0.002 0.137 0.066* 1.951 0.002 0.019 0.047 1.363 
31 -0.001 -0.093 0.065* 1.905 -0.002 -0.019 0.045 1.306 
32 -0.009 -0.431 0.056 1.584 -0.010 -0.093 0.035 0.973 
33 0.000 0.016 0.056 1.590 0.000 -0.001 0.035 0.971 
34 0.006 0.287 0.062* 1.734 0.005 0.042 0.041 1.107 
35 0.004 0.210 0.066* 1.844 0.003 0.026 0.044 1.197 
36 -0.003 -0.246 0.063* 1.736 -0.004 -0.042 0.040 1.082 
37 0.005 0.234 0.068* 1.863 0.005 0.046 0.045 1.216 
38 -0.005 -0.369 0.062* 1.696 -0.006 -0.066 0.039 1.041 
39 0.001 0.089 0.063* 1.724 0.000 0.001 0.040 1.044 
40 -0.007 -0.497 0.056 1.501 -0.007 -0.081 0.032 0.828 
41 0.007 0.181 0.063 1.661 0.006 0.023 0.038 0.970 
42 0.000 -0.014 0.063 1.652 -0.001 -0.009 0.037 0.933 
43 0.002 0.129 0.065* 1.699 0.001 0.013 0.038 0.963 
44 -0.001 -0.075 0.063 1.663 -0.002 -0.018 0.036 0.909 
45 0.000 0.027 0.064 1.675 0.000 -0.004 0.035 0.896 
46 -0.001 -0.044 0.063 1.637 -0.002 -0.010 0.033 0.843 
47 0.001 0.063 0.063 1.654 0.000 0.004 0.033 0.850 
48 0.004 0.243 0.067* 1.752 0.003 0.032 0.037 0.934 
49 0.004 0.179 0.071* 1.842 0.003 0.022 0.040 1.008 
50 0.002 0.145 0.072* 1.882 0.001 0.015 0.041 1.034 
51 -0.003 -0.202 0.070* 1.810 -0.003 -0.038 0.038 0.953 
52 0.004 0.273 0.074* 1.908 0.003 0.035 0.041 1.038 
53 -0.002 -0.128 0.072* 1.845 -0.003 -0.023 0.038 0.966 
54 -0.008 -0.573 0.063 1.591 -0.009 -0.110 0.029 0.717 
55 0.001 0.091 0.065 1.622 0.001 0.007 0.030 0.733 
56 0.000 0.024 0.065 1.631 0.000 0.002 0.030 0.738 
57 0.001 0.093 0.066 1.665 0.001 0.009 0.031 0.758 
58 -0.004 -0.268 0.063 1.561 -0.004 -0.046 0.027 0.652 
59 0.002 0.104 0.065 1.618 0.001 0.010 0.028 0.687 
60 -0.003 -0.221 0.062 1.543 -0.004 -0.045 0.025** 2.027 
A superscript *, ** or *** indicates significance at 10 percent,5 percent or 1 percent 





APPENDIX D: Regression Result 
 
Variables 






Constant 0.0781 0.88 0.383 0.2394*** 2.58 0.011 
IO 0.0224 0.91 0.366 0.0213 0.93 0.355 
SIZE -0.0103 -0.89 0.378 -
0.0279*** 
-2.25 0.026 
















A superscript *, ** or *** indicates significance at 10 percent,5 percent or 1 percent 






























APPENDIX E  : Segregate Regression Analysis Result with Different Event 
 CAR(0,5) CAR(0,10) 
 12th GE 13th GE 14th GE 12th GE 13th GE 14th GE 
 Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob 
Constant 0.0271 0.8040 0.2332 0.1500 -0.3318 0.4720 0.0086 0.9370 0.5141** 0.0360 0.0740 0.8470 
IO 
0.0231 0.4280 -0.0606 0.3020 0.2960 0.1940 0.0166 0.5610 -0.0976* 0.2340 0.2001 0.3060 
SIZE 
-0.0026 0.8800 -0.0201 0.2640 0.0115 0.7750 0.0033 0.8470 -0.0496 0.0560 -0.0268 0.4490 
LEVERAGE 
-0.2537 0.0730* -0.0940 0.3490 0.0372 0.7970 -0.1692* 0.0850 -0.1901 0.1880 -0.0770 0.5650 
ROA 
0.3748 0.0000*** -0.1616 0.1140 -0.2763 0.1100 0.1726 0.1040 -0.2744** 0.0310 -0.4566*** 0.0040 
A superscript *, ** or *** indicates significance at 10 percent,5 percent or 1 percent confidence level, respectively 
 
 
 
